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ABSTRACT
This dissertation deals with two areas of Navajo grammar
which involve problems traditionally subsumed under the rubric
of "coreference." These are relativization and pronominali-
zation. In both of these areas of grammar, situations arise
in which there would appear to be a coreference relationship
holding between an overt noun phrase argument and some
distinct noun phrase position (elsewhere in the same sentence)
which is "empty" in the sense that it is not overtly occupied
by a phonologically constituted element (pronoun or lexical
noun phrase). It is to this situation that the expression
"missing noun phrase", included in the dissertation title,
alludes.
The first chapter reviews earlier work on Navajo which
treats missing noun phrases as arising through the action of
a deletion rule generalized so as to effect the derivation of
relative clauses as well as cases which constitute the Navajo
analogue to "pronominalization", so familiar in the study of
English and other Indo-European languages. This chapter also
introduces the Second Noun Phrase Constraint, whose purpose
is to insure that surface structures with missing noun phrases
correlate properly with deep structures expressing the gram-
matical relations which arguments bear to verbs. The burden
of the rest of the work is to demonstrate that this constraint
is unnecessary in the grammar of Navajo, once a proper under-
standing of the missing noun phrase phenomenon is achieved.
The second chapter takes issue with the idea that
relativization and pronominalization are the same grammatical
process in Navajo, thereby weakening the position which holds
that the Second Noun Phrase Constraint is a condition on a
rule of Navajo grammar. Several contrasts are drawn between
relativization and pronominalization, and it becomes
questionable whether deletion is involved in either process.
In addition, it is suggested that the headless relative
clause--i.e., the favored form in surface structures, for all
Navajo speakers--is the basic form in underlying structures,
the more marginal right-headed structure being derived by
means of a movement rule.
Chapter Three develops a Navajo analogue to the theory
of pronominalization according to which pronouns are
generated in the base. According to this Navajo analogue,
5
"pronouns" are unexpanded NPs--symbolized
NP
I
PRO
for purposes of exposition. This chapter also argues that
there is in fact no need for any special rule of pronominali-
zation. No mechanisms beyond Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule
(appropriately extended to apply in the Navajo situation) are
needed. This position is referred to as "the best possible
theory" of Navajo pronominalization, since it requires no
special rules. A potential counter-argument to this best
possible theory is introduced at the end of the chapter when
the now defunct Second Noun Phrase Constraint is reformulated
as a surface structure condition enabling the revised theory
of Navajo grammar to match surface strings with the correct
deep structures.
The fourth and final chapter, after reviewing certain
fundamental assumptions upon which the analysis offered in
Chapter Three is based, presents evidence against a special
constraint which requires coreference between an overt noun
phrase and an immediately following PRO. Subsequent to this,
a revised conception of Navajo coreference interprecations is
offered. This revised conception of the problem makes use of
an interpretive strategy employed by Navajo speakers in under-
standing sentences. The interpretive strategy is in effect a
principle for the Interpretation of Grammatical Relations,
and it is abbreviated IGR. The force of the IGR, it is
argued, makes unnecessary the constraints on surface structures
to which the Second Noun Phrase Constraint of Chapter One was
ancestral. At the end of the chapter, the contrast between
relativization and pronominalization is formalized by pro-
posing a tentative theory of the right-headed relative clause
which employs a mechanism utterly distinct from any mechanism
involved in pronominalization. And finally, an alternative to
the framework of Chapter Three--addressed to certain remaining
problems--is briefly considered. In this alternative, missing
noun phrases are "truly missing" in deep structures. That is
to say, for example, a missing argument does not correspond
to an unexpanded NP-node in the deep structure phrase marker;
rather, the NP-node is itself missing in deep structure.
Thesis Supervisor: Kenneth Hale
Professor of Linguistics
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO NAVAJO
RELATIVIZATION AND PRGNOMINALIZATION
1.0 Introduction
In recent times, one of the more interesting topics
discussed by linguists has been that of coreference. The
study of the Navajo language is not exceptional in its
ability to reveal new facts concerning this topic of
coreference. In the present study, I will briefly review
recent accounts dealing with different aspects of Navajo
anaphora--concentrating initially on the relative clause
and so-called "zero pronominalization"--and I will propose
a new departure that appears to achieve greater descriptive
adequacy.
1.1 The Relative Clause
The Navajo relative clause appears in two forms. The
first of these is common in verb-final languages the world
over. It is the type in which a "head" noun phrase follows
the relative clause and in which the "relative" noun
phrase--i.e., the shared noun phrase in the subordinate
clause--appears to be simply deleted. For example, consider
sentence (1.1):
(1.1) Dahneeshjjd 9 hastiin yidloh.
(jump:REL man laugh) 1
The man who jumped is laughing.
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which, according to previous works (cf. Platero 1974), is
derived from an underlying structure of the following form:
(1.2) S
NP
S REL
NP VI I
hastiin dahneeshjj.d -*e hastiin yid'
man iump -REL man lauc
loh
qh
.
Let us refer to the theory in which (1.1) is derived from
(1.2) as the "Deletion Theory" of Navajo relative clauses.
In this theory, the deletion is accomplished by means of a
rule of roughly the form given in (1.3) below:
(1.3) X [NP [S Y NP Z]S NP]Np W
1 2 3 4 5 6 =>
1 2 0 4 5 6
Condition. 3 = 5
It was demonstrated in Platero (1974), that this "backward
deletion"--i.e., deletion of the identical noun phrase in
the subordinate clause--applies over a true variable. That
is to say, there is no apparent limit in terms of the
distance which can separate the trigger and target noun
phrases. This sort of apparent backward deletion is familiar
enough, being well documented in such verb-final languages
as Japanese (Kuno 1973), Turkish (Knecht and Hankamer 1976),
11
and Basque (deRijk 1972).
But what is of special interest here is the fact that
Navajo apparently also allows "forward deletion"--not allowed
in the more familiar verb-final languages. This apparent
forward deletion results in a structure in which the head
noun phrase is missing--it results in the so-called "headless"
relative clause. That is to say, the relative noun phrase
is present while the head noun phrase is missing. This
second alternative--i.e., the headless relative clause--is
vastly preferred over the type represented by sentence (1.1)
It is exemplified in (1.4) below.
(1.4) Hastiin dahneeshjodoe yidloh.
(man jump:REL laugh)
According to the deletion theory, this sentence is also
derived from the underlying structure (1.2), but by deletion
of the head noun phrase rather than by deletion of the
relative noun phrase. The deletion is accomplished by a rule
of the following form:
(1.5) X [NP [S Y NP Z]S NP]Np W
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 0 6
Condition: 3 = 5
Note that the structural description of this rule is identical
to that of (1.3), only the structural change is different--
rule (1.3) effects a backward deletion, while rule (1.5)
12
effects a forward deletion.
It is perhaps not evident as yet that the relative noun
phrase /hastiin/ in (1.4) is in fact located within the
embedded clause, rather than, say, outside of it and to its
left. But I can establish that it is indeed internal to the
relative clause by arranging matters so as to "surround" the
relative noun phrase with material which clearly belongs to
the embedding. For example, consider (1.6):
(1.6) Ad$$d4 ' dahneeshjjd~g hastiin yidloh.
(yesterday jump:REL man laugh)
The man who jumped yesterday is laughing.
where, by backward deletion, the relative noun phrase is
missing. But forward deletion will remove the head noun
phrase, leaving the relative noun phrase in the very position
it occupied in the underlying structure--i.e., forward
deletion gives (1.7) which is directly underlain by (1.8):
(1.7) Ad64d$a' hastiin dahneeshjjd6g yidloh.
(yesterday man jump:REL laugh)
(1.8) S
NP V
s½
S REL
Adv NP VI I I
ad44d44' hastiin dahneeshjid -~ •e hastiin yidloh
yesterday man jump -REL man laugh
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It is clearly the case here that the relative noun phrase
/hastiin/ is within the embedded clause, since it is preceded
and followed by material belonging to that embedded sentence.
Notice the similarities of rules (1.3) and (1.5).
Although they are distinct in terms of the direction of the
deletion, their structural descriptions are identical. It is
possible to collapse the two rules with respect to their
structural descriptions into a combined rule of the following
form:
(1.9) X [N [S Y NP Z] S NP]Np W
1 2 3 4 5 6=>
(a) 1 2 0 4 5 6
(b) 1 2 3 4 0 6
Condition: 3 = 5
This rule (1.9) is capable of deriving headed relative
clauses by applying the structural change given in subpart
(a). This is, in fact, the structural change of rule (1.3).
Similarly, subpart (b) has exactly the same effect as the
structural change in (1.5) above--it results in the headless
relative clause.
1.2 Pronominalization
Apparent forward deletion, similar in its overall effect
to that used in relative clauses, is apparently involved in
the derivation of sentences like (1.10) below. For the sake
of familiarity, let us refer to this process as
14
"pronominalization."
(1.10) Hastiin deezghal d66 nidii'na'.
(man awaken and get:up)
The man awoke and got up.
According to the deletion theory, this sentence has roughly
the following underlying structure:
(1.11) S
S S
NP V NP VI I 1
hastiin deezghal d66 hastiin nidii'na'
man awaken and man get:up
The surface sentence (1.10) is derived by deleting the second
occurrence of the noun phrase /hastiin/. But as in English,
so also in Navajo, backward deletion is not possible in
(1.11). Backward deletion is possible into a subordinate
clause only. Thus, in a structure of the following form,
either forward or backward deletion is possible:
(1.12)
IL
nastlin aeezgnal -go nastlin niaiL nav
man awaken -COMP man get:up
Forward deletion would give
,,,,
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(1.13) Hastiin deezghalgo nidii'na'.
(man awaken:COMP get:up)
When the man awoke, he got up.
And backward deletion would give
(1.14) Deezghalgo hastiin nidii'na'.
(awaken:COMP man get:up)
When he awoke, the man got up.
In the deletion theory, we must insure that backward deletion
is allowable only into a subordinate clause. Notice that
precisely the same is true in relative clauses--i.e., by
virtue of the structure assigned to a relative clause, back-
ward relativization (deletion) is, in fact, into a
subordinate clause.
1.3 Deletion Process Generalized
Under the assumption that deletion is involved both in
relative clause formation and in pronominalization, there is
an obvious similarity between the two processes: the deletion
is bidirectional in both, and backward deletion is identically
constrained in both. In previous work on Navajo anaphora
(e.g., Platero 1974), this similarity led to the proposal that
a single deletion operation was involved in the derivation of
relative clauses and pronominalization. Formally, this
identification of the two processes is achieved by simply
deleting the labelled bracketing from the structural descrip-
tion of rule (1.9) and appending a condition' to the effect
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that the structural change involving backward deletion is
possible only where the noun phrase to be deleted is in a
subordinate clause. The combined process of deletion can be
expressed as follows:
(1.15) Identical Noun Phrase Deletion
X - NP - Y - NP - Z
1 2 3 4 5 =>
(a) 1 2 3 0 5
(b) 1 0 3 4 5
Conditions: (1) 2 = 4
(2) (b) only if 2 is in
subordinate clause
This rule will apply alike to the structures assumed to
underly relative clauses--e.g., (1.2) and (1.8)--and to
structures which underly pronominalization--e.g., (1.11) and
(1.12).
1.4 An Apparent Constraint on Deletion
Let us for the time being leave matters as they are and,
continuing to assume the deletion theory, let us consider the
operation of (1.15) into subordinate clauses more carefully.
In our examples heretofore, only intransitive sentences were
used to exemplify deletion of a noun phrase from a subordinate
clause. It is possible, of course, to have a transitive
sentence embedded as a relative clause, as in the following
pre-deletion structure:
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(1.16) S
NP V
S
S REL
NP NP VI I I
ashkii at'e6d yi'disool -#Q ashkii deezgo'
boy girl whistle -REL boy fall
By rule (1.15a), sentence (1.17) is derived:
(1.17) Ashkii at'66d yi'disool'Q deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle:REL fall)
The boy who was whistling at the girl
(tripped and) fell.
The girl that the boy was whistling at
(tripped and) fell.
This sentence is ambiguous with respect to the question of
which of the two remaining noun phrases is to be understood
as the subject of the main verb. This ambiguity, which is
a common property of certain headless relative clauses in
Navajo, will be taken up at a later point. Our interest
now is in backward deletion, which can also apply to (1.16).
Its application will yield the following:
(1.18) At'46d yi'disool16 ashkii deezgo'
(girl whistle:REL boy fall)
The boy who was whistling at the girl
(tripped and) fell.
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Of special interest is the fact that this sentence is
unambiguous with respect to the grammatical function of the
noun phrase /at'66d/ in relation to the embedded verb. The
point is that it bears the same relation to the verb
/yi'disool/ in (1.18) as it does in the simple sentence
(1.19) Ashkii at'66d yi'disool.
(boy girl whistle)
The boy whistles at the girl.
This sentence conforms to the SOV pattern of Navajo
transitive sentences containing third person noun phrases.
That is to say, the first noun phrase is the subject and the
second is the object (there is also a morphologically distinct
OSV pattern for transitive sentences which will be discussed
later). Notice that sentence (1.19) has precisely the form
of the embedded sentence in (1.16).
The lack of ambiguity in (1.18) creates a problem for
the deletion rule as stated in (1.15). The problem is this:
Why couldn't (1.18) have a reading corresponding to the
underlying structure (1.20)?
(1.20)
P NI
at'"6d ashkii yi'disool -~e ashlii deezgo'
girl boy whistle -REL boy fall
19
In this structure the noun phrase /at'66d/ corresponds to the
subject rather than the object, as in the perfectly well-
formed simple sentence (1.21)
(1.21) At'66d ashkii yi'disool.
(girl boy whistle)
The girl is whistling at the boy.
Rule (1.15), as stated, will apply to (1.20) producing a
string identical to (1.18). However, that string cannot be
understood to have the meaning in (1.20). Notice that there
is nothing semantically odd about (1.20) because forward
deletion produces the perfectly well-formed sentence
(1.22) At'66d ashkii yi'disoo1@g deezgo'.
(girl boy whistle:REL fall)
(a) The girl who was whistling at the boy
(tripped and) fell.
(b) The boy who the girl was whistling at
(tripped and) fell.
one of whose readings--i.e., subpart (b)--corresponds to the
meaning represented in the structure (1.20). But it is
precisely that reading which is not available for (1.18).
One move which can be made in the deletion theory in order
to account for the lack of ambiguity in (1.18) is to place
an additional constraint upon the deletion rule. This is the
move I made in my study of Navajo relative clauses in 1974.
The constraint can be stated in roughly the following form:
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(1.23) Second Noun Phrase Constraint
In transitive sentences of the form
...NP NP V,
only the first NP may be deleted.
(Actually, I argued in my earlier study that this applies
only to cases in which the two NPs are third person. In
fact, however, constraints on interpretation involving the
linear order of noun phrases are enforced only in cases
where the noun phrases are third person. Therefore, in my
continuing discussion wherever the category NP is referred
to, it can be assumed that the noun phrase is a third
person).
The constraint (1.23) will prevent backward deletion--
i.e., case (b) of (1.15)--from applying to (1.20). That is,
the constraint will prevent the derivation of the string
(1.18) from the structure (1.20), thereby accounting for
the lack of ambiguity of (1.18).
Notice that (1.23) will not only constrain backward
deletion but also forward deletion in so-called pronominali-
zation. Consider, for example, the structure
(1.24)
NP
ashkii
boy enter and boy girl whistle
Since this is a conjoined structure, only fdrward deletion--
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i.e., case (a) of (1.15)--can apply, yielding
(1.25) Ashkii yah'i{yA d66 at'6ed yi'd6es661.
(boy enter and girl whistle)
The boy entered and whistled at the girl.
Like the relative clause in (1.18), the second conjunct
in (1.24) is unambiguous. Specifically the noun phrase
/at'46d/ is understood as the object of the verb /yi'd66s661/
just as it is in the simple sentence (1.26) below:
(1.26) Ashkii at'66d yi'd66s661.
(boy girl whistle)
The boy whistled at the girl.
The prohibition against deleting the second noun phrase in
a structure of the form NP NP V -- i.e., constraint (1.23)--
will account for the lack of ambiguity of (1.25). That is
to say, the constraint will guarantee that (1.25) is not
derived from
(1.27)
NPI
ashkii
boy enter and girl boy whistle
In general, constraint (1.23) accounts for the fact
that no sequence of the form
(1.28) NP V
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which derives from a transitive sentence of the form
(1.29) NP NP V
has the interpretation according to which the deletion site
immediately precedes the verb. If we represent the deletion
site with the symbol GAP, a derived structure of the form
(1.28), will correspond in its interpretation to
(1.30) GAP NP V
rather than
(1.31) NP GAP V
Thus, in the sentences that we have been considering, the
GAP corresponds to the position of the subject noun phrase
rather than the object noun phrase, since the examples we
have chosen involve transitive sentences conforming to the
SOV pattern.
It is perhaps appropiate at this point to introduce
the OSV pattern which Navajo transitive sentences, involving
third person subject and object, may adopt. Consider the
sentence
(1.32) Ashkii at'46d yizts'Qs.
(boy girl kiss)
The boy kissed the girl.
This represents the SOV pattern. There is an alternative
form, cognitively synonymous with (1.32), to wit:
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(1.33) At'66d ashkii bizts'Qs.
(girl boy bi:kiss)
The girl was kissed by the boy.
In this form of the sentence, the object precedes the
subject. That is to say, the sentence conforms to the
pattern OSV. In addition to the difference in the linear
order of the noun phrases, (1.32) and (1.33) exhibit a
morphological difference in the verb word. Specifically,
in the SOV pattern, the third person object prefix is
represented by the morph /yi-/, while in the OSV pattern,
it is represented by the morph /bi-/. It has been assumed
(Hale (1973), Creamer (1974), Frishberg (1972), Witherspoon
(1977), and myself (1974)) that the OSV pattern is derived
by means of a transformation called subject-object-inversion
(SOI). I do not wish to commit myself as to the existence
of this rule as a genuine transformation. I will simply
assume it here for expository purposes. The rule might be
expressed in very abbreviated form, as follows:
(1.34) NP - NP - yi-V
1 2 3 4 =>
2 1 bi 4
In actual fact this formulation masks a large number of
details, particularly in relation to terms 3 and 4 in the
structural description. The prefix /yi-/ is actually a
Prart of the verb word and may or may not be initial in it.
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In addition to the morphological details, there are
conditions on the application of SOI relating t6 semantic
content of the noun phrases (see references for discussion).
What is relevant here is the interpretation of the noun
phrases appearing in the two alternative patterns. The
The interpretation conforms to the following principles
(from Hale, Jeanne, and Platero 1976):
(1.35) Interpretation of Grammatical Relations
NP is
(a) Object / _yi-V
Subject/ bi-V
(b) Subject/ NP yi-V
Object / NP bi-V
By these principles, sentences of the form
(1.36) NP NP yi-V
will be assigned the functional profile
(1.36') S O V
while sentences of the form
(1.37) NP NP bi-V
will be assigned the functional profile
(1.37') OS V
Now let us return to a reconsideration of the Second
Noun Phrase Constraint--i.e., (1.23) above. ,If (1.23) is
correct as stated then it should also pertain to cases in
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which the target for deletion appears in an inverted
sentence like (1.33). Consider, for example, the
following structure
(1.38) S
S S
NP V NP NP VJ Il I I I
at 66d yah'iiya d66 at'66d ashkii bizts'Qs
girl enter and girl boy bi:kiss
Forward deletion in this instance derives
(1.39) At'e6d yah'{iyA d66 ashkii bizts'Qs.
(girl enter and boy bi:kiss)
The girl entered and was kissed by the boy.
The second conjunct in this sentence is in fact, unambiguous
and receives only the interpretation corresponding to (1.33).
Thus, it appears that the Second Noun Phrase Constraint
gives the correct result since it guarantees that the
deletion site in (1.39) precedes the noun phrase /ashkii/
and therefore, that the surface string would not come from
the following structure:
(1.40) S
S S
WP V NP NP V
at'66d yah'iya d66 ashkii at'46d bizts'9s
girl enter and boy girl bi:kiss
Sentence (1.39) illustrates forward deletion into an
26
inverted sentence. The following sentence illustrates
backward deletion into an inverted sentence:
(1.41) Ashkii bizts'Qs&g at'66d hadoolghaazh.
(boy bi:kiss:REL girl scream)
The girl that was kissed by the boy screamed.
Here again (1.23) correctly predicts that the sentence is
unambiguous. Under the deletion hypothesis, the sentence
must come from
(1.42) V
NP V
S NP
S REL
NP NP V
at'c6d ashkii bizts'Qs -oe at'66d hadooli
girl boy bi:kiss -REL girl scream
ghaazh
and not from
(1.43) S
NP V
NP NP
S REL
NP NP V
I I I
ashkii at'eed bizts'Qs -CC at'6d hadoolghaazh
boy girl bi:kiss -REL girl scream
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1.5 An Additional Constraint
The constraint expressed in (1.23) has basically the
following effect: It prevents deletion of the object noun
phrase in sentences with the functional profile SOV, and
it prevents deletion of subject noun phrase in sentences
with the functional profile OSV. For the cases we have
considered so far, this is sufficient to predict the
observed facts concerning the interpretation of surface
strings resulting from deletion. It is not sufficient,
in general, however, as we shall see presently. Consider
the following structure:
has isool
man boy girl see -REL boy whistle
Backward deletion in (1.44)--applying in conformity with
(1.23)--gives rise to the following surface string:
(1.45) Hastiin at'66d yiyiiltsAn @ ashkii yi'disool.
(man girl see:REL boy whistle)
$(a) The man is whistling at the boy who saw the girl.
(b) The man who saw the girl is whistling at the boy.
(c) The girl that the man saw is whistling at the boy.
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We would expect sentence (1.45) to be semantically consis-
tent with the structure it presumably came from--i.e., to
have reading (a) above. However, the meaning of (1.45)
differs from that embodied in (1.44)--specifically, it has
either the interpretation (b), as if it derived from (1.46)
below:
(1.46) S
NP NP V
S NP
S REL
hastiin at'6ed yiyiiltso(n) -'p hastiin ashkii yi'di•sool
man girl see -REL man boy whistle
or the interpretation (c), identical to (1.46) but with
/at'66d/ in head position. Because backward deletion
applied to (1.44) does not violate condition (1.23), it is
apparent that the constraint is not sufficient. Notice
that backward deletion in the substructure (1.47), contained
within (1.44), must be allowed:
(1.47)
as
boy girl see -REL boy
0
di
boy girl see -REL 
boy
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This follows, since (1.48) is perfectly well-formed:
(1.48) At'66d yiyii1tsAniv ashkii yidloh.
(girl see:REL boy laugh)
The boy who saw the girl is laughing.
The special property of structure (1.44) which is relevant to
backward deletion relates to the fact that the complex noun
phrase is in object position rather than subject position.
Because of this, the complex noun phrase is itself preceded
by a noun phrase belonging to the main clause. Evidently,
this is what is responsible for the interpretations which
result. To correct for this, we might propose a constraint
in addition to the one already embodied in (1.23) which would
prevent deletion from applying even to the first noun phrase
where that is immediately preceded by a noun phrase in the
main clause. This constraint may be formulated as follows:
(1.49) In a structure of the form
X NP1 [S NP2 Y]S Z
NP2 may not be deleted.
This additional constraint will guarantee that sentence (1.45)
will not be derived from (1.44) It will, however, permit
(1.48) to be derived by backward deletion, since in that
sentence, the target noun phrase is not preceded by a noun
Sphrase in the main clause.
The constraint expressed in (1.49) evidently also applies
in the case of forward deletion. In this connection consider
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sentence (1.50)
(1.50) At'46d yah'iUyaago ashkii aw44' yaa'AhilyiAn
(girl enter:COMP boy baby care:for:REL
yich'ah66shkeed.
scold)
When the girl entered, she scolded the boy who
was taking care of the baby.
The meaning that I have provided here corresponds to the
following:
(J
NP
at' 6d
girl
a!
boy baby for:care -REL boy scold
The deletions which derived (1.50) from (1.51) do not violate
either of the constraints (1.23) or (1.49). It is not
possible to interpret (1.50) as coming from (1.52) below. 2
I
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(1.52) S
NP
at' 6ed yich' ah66shkeedat'
girl baby for:care -REL girl scold
In theory, according to the deletion hypothesis we are now
considering, sentence (1.51) could be derived from (1.52) by
first allowing deletion to apply in the complex noun phrase
(deleting /at'64d/ from head position) and then, at the root
sentence level, permitting forward deletion to apply again
deleting /at'4'd/ from the relative clause itself. The latter
deletion, however, would be in violation of (1.49). The fact
that the reading corresponding to structure (1.52) is
impossible to get shows that (1.49) operates to block forward
deletion in relevant cases, just as it blocks backward dele-
tion in cases like (1.44).
1.6 A Generalization of the Constraints
The reader will notice, no doubt, that constraints (1.23)
and (1.49) are virtually identical in global perspective; both
q
'--w" Vp -0 0 ýW Ab dN
32
of them have the effect of blocking the deletion of the
second of two noun phrases in sequence. Constraint (1.23)
is formulated so as to apply within a clause, while (1.49) is
formulated to apply across a clause boundary. Clearly,
therefore, the two constraints can be collapsed into the
more general formulation (1.53) by simply removing the term
V from (1.23) and the bracket from (1.49):
(1.53) Second Noun Phrase Constraint (Revised)
The second NP may not be deleted from a
structure of the form
X - NP - NP -Y
Formulated in this way, the Second Noun Phrase Constraint
will block deletion in all of the relevant cases. There is,
however, one additional refinement which must be added to the
constraint, in order to account for the interpretation of
sentences like (1.54) below.
(1.54) Ashkii at'66d yiyiiltsan@ yizts'Qs.
(boy girl see:REL kiss)
The boy kissed the girl he saw.
Presumably, under the deletion hypothesis, this sentence
derives from the structure (1.55):
33
as s'QS
boy boy girl see -REL girl kiss
Assuming that the second occurance of /ashkii/ is deleted
from this structure, sentence (164) clearly involves a case
in which the second of two adjacent noun phrases is deleted.
In this instance, however, the first of the two noun phrases
is actually the trigger of the deletion. We must, therefore,
append to our revised constraint an exception clause to the
effect that deletion is allowed where the first noun phrase
triggers the deletion. The final revision will look some-
thing like the following:
(1.56) Second Noun Phrase Constraint (Final Revision)
The second noun phrase may not be deleted from
a structure of the form
X - NP - NP - Y
except where the first noun phrase triggers
the deletion.
This revision, of course, hinges on the assumption that the
second occurence of /ashkii/ in (1.55) rather than the first
is deleted. In other words, we assume deletions cannot apply
upwards and backwards.
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The constraint embodied in (1.56) will account for an
observation pertaining to simple sentences as well as the
observations concerning the interpretation of complex sentences
of the type we have been considering heretofore. Consider the
following simple sentence:
(1.57) Ashkii bizh6'6 yiyiilts$.
(boy his:father see)
(a) The boy saw his father.
(b)i The boy's father saw him.
The relevant interpretation of this sentence is the one which,
according to the deletion theory, corresponds to a structure
of the following form:
(1.58) S
NP NP V
NP N
ashkii ashcii bi-zh2 6' yiyiilts4
boy boy his-father see
Actually, sentence (1.57) is ambiguous but the immediately
relevant fact is that it cannot have the meaning which would
correspond to the following structural description:
(1.59) S
NP NP
NP N
ashkii bi-zhe' ashkii yiyiiltsQ
boy his-father boy see
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That is to say, (1.57) cannot have the meaning (b). Notice
that the structural description of (1.59) is well-formed
from a strictly structural point of view, since, except for
the actual lexical items present, it is matched by the well-
formed structure (1.60).
(1.60) S
NP
I I
ashkii bi-zh6'6 at'66d yiyiiltso
boy his-father girl see
which directly underlies (1.61) below.
(1.61) Ashkii bizh6'6 at'66d yiyiiltso.
(boy his:father girl see)
The boy's father saw the girl.
The fact that (1.57) cannot be derived from (1.59) follows
from the Second Noun Phrase Constraint forbidding the deletion
of the second of two successive noun phrases, and the fact
that (1.57) can have the (a) reading follows from the fact
that deletion is allowed in (1.58) by virtue of the exception
clause appended to the Second Noun Phrase Constraint. Thus,
the fact that (1.57) cannot have the (b) reading can be
explained in the same way as the fact that the second clause
of sentence (1.62) below cannot have the meaning associated
with (1.60).
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(1.62) At'64d yah'ioyA d66 ashkii bizh6'4 yiyiiltso.
(girl enter and boy his:father see)
(a) The girl entered and saw the boy's father.
(b) $The girl entered and the boy's father saw her.
That is to say, sentence (1.62) cannot have the (b) reading
since that would imply a deletion site between the noun phrase
/ashkii bizh6'6/ and the verb-word /yiyiilts*/. The Second
Noun Phrase Constraint is specifically designed to prevent
that situation. It is, of course, possible for Navajo to
express the (b) meanings cited under (1.57) and (1.62) by
resorting to the inverted--i.e., 0 S bi-V--forms of transitive
sentences. Thus, for example, the (b) meaning cited under
(1.57) can be expressed as follows:
(1.63) Ashkii bizh4'6 biilts4.
(boy his:father bi:see)
(a) The boy was seen by his father.
(b) OThe boy's father was seen by him.
According to the deletion theory as constrained by (1.56),
the (a) reading of (1.63) must come from:
(1.64)
boy boy his-father bi:see
The constraint is formulated in such a way as to insure that
boy boy 
i h
bi: see
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(1.63) cannot derive from (1.65).
(1.65) S
NP NP V
NP NI I
ashkii bi-zhe' 6 ashkii biiltso
boy his-father boy bi:see
and therefore cannot have the reading (1.63b). Precisely
analogous observations can be made concerning the following
sentence in which an inverted version of (1.60) underlies the
second clause:
(1.66) At'eed yah'iyA d66 ashkii bizh64' biilts$.
(girl enter and boy his:father bi:see)
(a) The girl entered and was seen by the boy's
father.
(b) i The girl entered and the boyIs father was
seen byher.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Where relevant, the internal structure of Navajo verbs
is indicated by hyphenation, both in the Navajo sentence
and in the parenthetic glossing. If the Navajo is not
hyphenated, the glossing employs a colon to separate
meaningful elements. Navajo verbs are glossed by means of
the English bare infinitive--i.e., without tense. The
actual tense is reflected in the free translations, however.
2. In Hale and Platero, 1974, there was equivocation on
this issue in connection with a similar sentence. I am
convinced now that (1.50) cannot in fact be understood as
deriving from (1.52) and that this observation is correct
for all cases of this type.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTRAST BETWEEN
RELATIVIZATION AND PRONOMINALIZATION
2.0 Introduction
My discussion so far has been concentrated on the problem
of constraining the putative deletion rule so that the sentences
which are produced by its application are matched with the
proper underlying structures. This is in keeping with the
assumption that the meaning implied by the underlying
representation of a particular sentence should survive as a
reading of the sentence itself. In other words, the purpose
of the Second Noun Phrase Constraint (1.56) is to insure that
an observed reading of the sentence be relatable to a deep
structure that expresses that meaning.
Before I go on to indicate certain empirical problems
with the Second Noun Phrase Constraint itself, and with this
approach in general, I wish to address myself briefly to another
aspect of the analysis of relative clauses and so-called
pronominalization--i.e., the assumption that a single rule
is involved, an assumption based primarily on the two obser-
vations: (a) that forward and backward deletion are used
for both processes, and (b) that the deletion is evidently
similarly constrained, by (1.56), in both cases.
If the assumption of a single rule is false, then (1.56)
is not properly a condition on a rule but rathler a more
general principle involved in the recovery of underlying
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.structures in Navajo.
2.1 Extrasentential Reference in Pronominalization
The assumption that relativization and pronominalization
are the same rule was challenged in Hale and Platero (1974),
but the distinction between the two processes can be much
more forcefully drawn than in that paper.
Whether or not deletion is actually involved in relative
clause formation, it is very unlikely that pronominalization
actually involves deletion under identity as implied by rule
(1.15). Consider, for example, (1.13) and (1.14), repeated
here for convenience:
(1.13) Hastiin deezghalgo nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP get:up)
When the man awoke, he got up.
(1.14) Deezghalgo hastiin nidii'na'.
(awake:COMP man get:up)
When he awoke, the man got up.
In my original discussion of these sentences, I considered
only the readings according to which the overt noun phrases,
and the missing noun phrases were coreferential. However,
both sentences have an interpretation in which that is not
the case. In other words, (1.13) can mean
When the man i awoke, he/she got up.
and (1.14) can mean
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When he/she. awoke, the man. got up.
In sentence (1.13), the subject argument in the main verb
/nidii'na'/ is not overtly present--i.e., it is a "missing
noun phrase". If its absence were due solely to the
action of rule (1.15), then the sentence could not be
ambiguous in the way that it in fact is. Similarly, in
sentence (1.14), the subject argument of the subordinate
verb /deezghal/ is missing and the sentence has a reading
which would not be available if rule (1.15) were responsible
for the gap.
Let us now contrast this behavior with that of relative
clauses. Consider, for example, the relative clauses in the
following sentences which, in the relevant sense, contrast
minimally with the pronominalization cases illustrated by
(1.13) and (1.14).
(2.1) (a) Hastiin deezghalQQ nidii'na'.
(man awake: REL get:up)
The man who awoke got up.
(b) Deezghal*Q hastiin nidii'na'.
(awake:REL man get:up)
The man who awoke got up.
These sentences are not ambiguous in the way (1.13) and
(1.14) are. The subject arguments of the main and subordinate
verbs must be understood as coreferential.
This contrast between the relative clause and the
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pronominalization cases is paralleled by an additional
T contrast. For any sentence in which a noun phrase is missing
from a particular position by virtue of pronominalization,
there is an equally grammatical sentence in which that
position is occupied by an overt noun phrase. Thus, for
example, the following sentences are fully grammatical.
(2.2) (a) Hastiin deezghalgo asdzAin nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP woman get:up)
When the man awoke, the woman got up.
(b) Asdz6An deezghalgo hastiin niodii'na '.
(woman awake:COMP man get:up)
When the woman awoke, the man got up.
These sentences are as grammatical as (1.13) and (1.14).
However, the corresponding situation is not true for
relative clauses. Thus, the following are ungrammatical.
(2.3) (a) *Hastiin deezghalg' asdz6An nidii'na'.
(man awake: REL woman get:up)
(b) *AsdzAan deezghalý@ hastiin nidii'na'.
(woman awake:REL ihan get:up)
2.2 The Headless Relative Clause and Right Dislocation
The observations just made about relative clauses in
contrast to pronominalization could, in the deletion theory,
be expressed (a) by imposing the condition that the head of
the relative clause be identical to some noun phrase in the
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relative clause, and (b) by requiring that either the head or
the relative noun phrase be deleted. However, I would like
to suggest an alternative proposal for relative clauses which
will achieve the same observational effect. This proposal is
similar in spirit to the one briefly explored in Hale and
Platero (1974). The proposal is this: Relative clauses are
basically headless in underlying representation. The headed
version of a relative clause is produced by moving a noun
phrase (the relative NP) into the head position following
the relative clause marker. This will have the effect of
creating a gap in the relative clause itself just as the
deletion operation did. Now, the constraint on the removal
of a noun phrase in this way will be the same as that embodied
in (1.56). Thus, only an initial noun phrase will be allowed
to move. By adopting a movement analysis of relative clauses,
together with the headless underlying structure, we account
very simply for the properties which distinguish relative
clauses from the cases of so-called pronominalization. Thus,
the non-ambiguity of the sentences of (2.1) and the ungram-
maticality of (2.3) follow from the fact that there is only
one position in which a lexical noun phrase may appear in the
underlying representations of (2.1)--i.e., in the subject
argument position of the subordinate verb /deezghal/ 'he/she
awoke'.
It is interesting to observe that Navajo possesses
another construction, not readily accepted by speakers as a
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part of the core of Navajo grammar, which exhibits certain
similarities to the headed relative clause, which itself is
the least favored of the relative clause types. This addi-
tional construction involves post-posing a noun phrase to
sentence final position in main clauses. I will refer to this
process as right dislocation. It is responsible for sentences
of the following type:
(2.4) At'66d yizts'Qs ashkii.
(girl kiss boy)
He kissed the girl, the boy.
This construction is similar to headed relative clauses in
that the right dislocated noun phrase is necessarily cons-
trued with a gap in the sentence itself. Furthermore, the
position of the gap is subject to the same constraint as in
the case of the headed relative clause. Thus, just as in the
relative clause
(2.5) At'66d yizts'Qs Q ashkii.
(girl kiss:REL boy)
/at'44d/ must be understood as the object of /yizts'Qs/, so
also in the right dislocation structure of (2.4) /at'66d/ must
be understood as object. This similarity carries over to
more complicated cases as well. Thus, for example, consider
the relative clause in the following sentence:
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(2.6) Ashkii adzaAn at'66d yizts'Qs ninee hadoolghaazh.
(boy woman girl kiss say: REL scream)
(a) The boy who said that the woman kissed the
girl screamed.
(b) The woman who the boy said kissed the girl
screamed.
(c) The girl who the boy said the woman kissed
screamed.
This sentence is ambiguous in the ways expected by virtue of
the complex headless relative clause structure. However, the
following sentence employing the headed relative clause is
unambiguous.
(2.7) AsdzdAn at'44d yizts'Qs ninee ashkii hadoolghaazh.
(woman girl kiss say:REL boy scream)
The boy who said that the woman kissed the
girl screamed.
This sentence is unambiguous, receiving only the interpreta-
tion according to which the boy is understood as the subject
of the verb /ni/ 'he said'. That is, /ashkii/ is construed
with an initial gap, and therefore, with the position which
it occupies in the headless relative clause of (2.6).
Now consider the right dislocation structure (2.8) below
(2.8) Asdz4An at'44d yizts'Qs ni ashkii.
(woman girl kiss say boy)
Hei said the woman kissed the girl, the boy.
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This sentence is unambiguous and receives the interpretation
according to which the right dislocated noun phrase /ashkii/
is understood as the subject of /ni/, as it is overtly in
(2.9) below:
(2.9) Ashkii asdzain at'66d yizts'Qs ni.
(boy woman girl kiss say)
The boy said the woman kissed the girl.
It should be pointed out that the non-ambiguity of (2.7) and
(2.9) is not due simply to the inability of a noun phrase to
extract out of an embedded clause but rather due to the
constraint against moving the second of two noun phrases in
sequence. Let us assume for the moment that movement is, in
fact, involved in developing the headed relative clause and
in right dislocation. That a noun phrase can extract from a
subordinate clause can be shown by the following sentences,
in which /ashkii/ is extracted from the complement of the
verb /dishni/ 'I said'.
(2.10) (a) (At'4ed yizts'Qs) dishninee ashkii hadoolghaazh.
(girl kiss I:say:REL boy scream)
The boy that I said kissed the girl screamed.
(b) (At'66d yizts'9s) dishni ashkii.
(girl kiss I:say boy)
I said he. kissed the girl, the boy..
These sentences receive the interpretation according to which
the noun phrase /ashkii/ is the subject of the verb /yizts'Qs/.
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In other words, the relation which the noun phrase /ashkii/
bears to /yizts'Qs/ is the same as in the following restored
versions of (2.10).
(2.11) (a) (Ashkii at'66d yizts'Qs) dishnin"e
(boy girl kiss I:say:REL
hadooghaazh.
scream)
(b) (Ashkii at'66d yizts'Qs) dishni.
(boy girl kiss I:say)
The point of this digression has been to suggest an
alternative conception of relative clause formation and to
compare it to another construction that involves the creation
of a gap. I do not wish to commit myself at this point to
the details of a movement analysis for the headed relative
clause. However, it is clear that the features which dis-
tinguish relative clauses from pronominalization could be
reflected in the grammar by an analysis of this nature. It
is- clear also, that if the headed relative clause is actually
produced by movement, some constraint akin to (1.56) would
have to be involved in order to insure that the output
structure be relatable to the correct underlying representa-
tion. Thus, for example, the relative clause (2.5) must,
under the movement analysis, derive from the structure
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(2.12) NPI
S
S REL
NP NP
I I I
ashkii at'66d yizts'Qs - 9
boy girl kiss -REL
and not from the structure
(2.13) NPI
S
REL
NP NP VI I I
at'66d ashkii yizts'Qs -*g
girl boy kiss -REL
Of course, the proper constraint is more global in nature,
since it is not enough to make reference to the more local
structure which constitutes the domain of the putative move-
ment rule itself--i.e., the complex noun phrase structure.
Thus, just as in the deletion theory, so in the movement
theory, we must avoid deriving sentence (1.45) from a
structure analogous to (1.44). Clearly, this cannot be done
if the constraint is permitted to refer solely to material
contained within the complex noun phrase structure to which
the rule itself applies--that is to say, the constraint must
have a more inclusive view of the total phrase marker than the
more limited substructure which defines the domain of the rule.
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Under the movement analysis we are considering, the
underlying structure corresponding to (1.44) would be roughly
the following:
(2.
has sool
man boy girl see -REL whistle
That is to say, the complex noun phrase would be as in (1.44)
but without the head noun phrase. The domain of the movement
rule, presumably, is the complex noun phrase, or perhaps the
structure containing the embedded sentence and the relative
clause marker REL. But in order to achieve the effect of
(1.56), the rule must be prevented from applying in (2.14).
However, the constraint which would prevent application here
must have reference to the matrix sentence in order to take
into consideration the noun phrase /hastiin/, which is not a
part of the domain of the movement rule. This observation is
consistent with the growing awareness that the effect which
(1.56) has attempted to produce relates to a more general
problem in the interpretation of sentences. The problem is
not specific to a particular rule of grammar but, rather,
relates to certain properties of surface structures regard-
less of the processes involved in their derivations. So, for
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example, while it is perfectly possible to compose an
analogue to (1.56) for the movement analysis of the headed
relative clause, say, the following:
(2.15) The second noun phrase may not be moved
from a structure of the form
X - NP - NP - Y ,
the effect which is desired is not properly viewed in terms
of rules, but in terms of surface structures and their inter-
pretations. The point is this, a surface string of the form
X - NP - X does not receive an interpretation according to
which a "gap" immediately follows the noun phrase--where by
"gap" we mean a noun phrase-argument position not occupied by
an overt noun phrase.
2.3 Number Agreement
Let us return now to the contrast between the behavior
of relativization and pronominalization. Consider first the
following sentence, which evidently involves a case of
pronominalization:
(2.16) Ashkii at'660 yizts'Qsgo dahdii'Aazh.
(boy girl kiss:COMP leave:dual)
When the boy kissed the girl, they left.
The main verb here has the property that its subject, when
overt, must be capable of referring to two entities--i.e., it
requires either an explicitly dual subject or else a non-
singular subject, as in
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(2.17) (a) Ashkii d66 at'66d dahdii' Azh.
(boy and girl leave:dual)
The boy and girl left.
(b) Ashiik6 dahdii'Aazh.
(boys leave:dual)
The boys left.
In (2.17a) the subject is a compound noun phrase, consisting
of two singular conjuncts, and is therefore exactly dual in
number. In (2.17b), the subject is a non-singular capable
of referring to two or more entities, and is therefore
compatible with the dual verb /dahdii'AAzh/. Returning
now to sentence (2.16), the subject of the main verb in
that sentence is not overtly present--i.e., it is not present
as a full noun phrase in the subject position for the main
verb. Nonetheless, the subject of the main verb is under-
stood as dual in number reference, as can be determined by
the form of the verb. While sentence (2.16) is ambiguous,
it admits the reading according to which the subject of
/dahdii'a~zh/ is understood as referring to the two
individuals mentioned in the subordinate clause--i.e., the
subordinate subject /ashkii/ and the subordinate object
/at'44d/. It is clear that rule (1.15), alone and as it
stands, cannot account for this reading of (2.16). The
only plausible fully specified source structure for (2.16),
under the deletion theory of pronominalization, is something
like the following:
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(2.181
NP I
aslii at' Taazh
boy girl kiss -COMP boy and girl leave:dual
In fact, this structure is well-formed in Navajo and directly
underlies the sentence
(2.19) Ashkii at'46d yizts'Qsgo ashkii d66 at'66d
(boy girl kiss:COMP boy and girl
dahdii'Aazh.
leave: dual)
which can be interpreted in a way which corresponds to the
reading of (2.16) with which we are now concerned. There-
fore, semantically, (2.18) would appear to be an appropriate
source for (2.16). The problem, however, is this: There
is in (2.18) no appropriate noun phrase antecedent to effect
the deletion of the compound subject of the main verb--the
understood subject of the main verb has what is commonly
referred to as a "split antecedent" in the subordinate
clause. It is quite evident that deletion is an inappropriate
mechanism to account for the facts of (2.16)--at least it is
inappropriate under the assumption that (2.18) is the source,
and that is the only plausible assumption under the deletion
theory. If deletion were, in fact, applicable in (2.18),
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then there is no reason to rule out the backward deletion
which rule (1.15) allows. However, if we permit the com-
pound noun phrases in the main clause of (2.18) to delete
the subject and object in the subordinate clause, we obtain
(2.20) Yizts'Qsgo ashkii d66 at'66d dahdii'AAzh.
(kiss:COMP boy and girl leave:dual)
(a) When he. kissed her., the boy and the
1 3 m
girln left.
(b) When she. kissed him., the boy and the
girl left.
n
(c) When they i kissed (him/her)j, (the boy
and girl)i left.
In Navajo this sentence does not receive the interpretation
corresponding to the meaning embodied in (2.18).
The foregoing is consistant with the possibility that
deletion is not in fact involved in the process to which
we have been referring by the term "pronominalization."
Our immediate concern, however, is not to determine the
exact nature of "pronominalization"--we will address that
question shortly--but rather to contrast it with relativi-
zation. Consider now sentence (2.21), containing a relative
clause, but otherwise constructed in close imitation of
sentence (2.16):
(2.21) *Ashkii at'6d yizts'9see dahdii'AAzh.
(boy girl kiss:REL leave:dual)
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This sentence is ungrammatical. The complex noun phrase
subject of (2.21) cannot be interpreted as referring to
two entities--i.e., as being dual in number--despite the
fact that two singular noun phrases appear in the sub-
ordinate clause, which is identical to the subordinate
clause in the grammatical sentence (2.16). Obviously,
therefore, it cannot be the case that relative clause
formation and pronominalization are identical processes.
At least, it is quite certain that both cannot be special
cases of the deletion rule (1.15).
The deletion analysis could, of course, account for
the ungrammaticality of (2.21). Thus, if we insisted that
exactly rule (1.15)--in its forward application--were
responsible for the headless form of the relative clause
in Navajo, and if, furthermore, we assume that selection--
in this case number selection--were determined by the head,
then the ungrammaticality of (2.21) would follow auto-
matically from the fact that the only possible sources of
relative clauses in (2.21) would be (2.22a,b), with
singular heads:
(2.22) (a) Ashkii at'66d yizts'Qs5Q ashkii....
(boy girl kiss:REL boy .... )
(b) Ashkii at'&4d yizts'9s~e at'66d....
(boy girl kiss:REL girl...)
Only these would serve as appropiate inputs to rule (1.15)
and their singular heads are in conflict with the inherent
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dual numbers of the verb /dahdii'aazh/; this constitutes a
selectional violation, just as do the simple sentences of
(2.23)
(2.23) (a) *Ashkii dahdii'6Azh.
(boy leave:dual)
(b) *At'4 d dahdii'iAzh.
(girl leave:dual)
and the complex sentence (2.24) containing the headed
relative clause corresponding to (2.22a):
(2.24) *At'66d yizts'QsQQ ashkii dahdii'AAzh.
(girl kiss:REL boy leave:dual)
However, while the deletion theory, under the assumption
just outlined, can account for the ungrammaticality of
(2.21), the grammaticality of (2.16), under the relevant
reading, poses a dilemma for the theory which holds that
the selfsame deletion process constitutes the central core of
relative clause formation and pronominalization.
2.4 Additional Remarks on the Relative Clause
I have suggested an alternative to the deletion
theory for relative clauses. In particular, I have suggested
that the headless relative clause may be the basic form in
underlying structure. If so, then no deletion whatsoever
is involved in producing such sentence as the grammatical
(2.25) below:
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(2.25) Ashkii at'66d yi'de6solo@ deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle: REL fall)
(a) The boy who whistled at the girl (tripped
and) fell.
(b) The girl who the boy whistled at (tripped
and) fell.
In introducing this .4o*iception of the headless relative
clause, I did not specify any mechanism for its interpreta-
tion. Specifically, I did not indicate how the complex
noun phrase as a whole is to be interpreted as coreferential
with a relative noun phrase--i.e., a noun phrase contained
within the subordinate clause. I will adopt here the
practice followed by Fauconnier (1971), according to which
the interpretation of a relative clause--at least the
.restrictive relative clause of the type with which we are
concerned here--is indicated by coindexing the superordi-
nate noun phrase node with a noun phrase in the sentence
which it dominates. In Navajo, evidently, this is all that
is required to account for the headless relative clause.
That is to say, there is, stricily speaking, no transforma-
tional process of relativization. There is simply the
interpretability condition that the complex noun phrase as a
whole be capable of referring to the same entity as does
some noun phrase in the subordinate clause. I will follow
Fauconnier in symbolizing this capability by means of co-
indexing in underlying phrase markers. Thus, for example,
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to the (a) reading of (2.25) will be attributed the
following representation:
(2.25')
ashkii. at'66d yi'd66s661 -9 deezgo1
And to the (b) reading will be attributed roughly the
following representation:
(2.25'') S
Npi V
1
ashkii at'eed. yi'dees661 -O deezgo'
In these representations I intend to be vague about the
exact structure which should be attributed to the relative
clause. In particular, I wish to remain vague about the
precise structural position of the relativizing element
Properly worked out, this conception of the relative
clause will account automatically for the ill-formedness
of (2.21). The structure of (2.21) would be roughly of
the following form:
p
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(2.21')
ashkii at'64d yizts'Qs - Q dahdii'iAzh
boy girl kiss -REL leave:dual
The complex noun phrase is in the structural position
appropiate to the subjAct of the main verb. In order to
be well-formed this relative clause expression must be
capable of referring to two entities since the main verb
requires a dual subject. However, the expression as a
whole cannot, in fact, refer to two entities since there
is no noun phrase in the subordinate clause which can so
refer. There are, to be sure, two noun phrases which
jointly refer to two entities, but there is no one noun
phrase which can, and this latter is the requirement, namely,
that coreference be possible between the relative clause
expression as a whole and some noun phrase in the subordi-
nate claucr--the sequence /ashkii at'64d/, although it
refers to two entities, is not a noun phrase. Just as in
the deletion theory, so in the headless base theory, the
grammaticality of (2.21) is attributable to conflicting
number selection. Thus, the subject of /dahdii'AAzh/ must
be dual, but the relative clause expression cannot, in
fact, be dual.
A proper formulation of the interpretation of relative
I
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(2.21') S
NP V
I
S
ashkii at'66d yizts'Qs -~e dahdii'aazh
boy girl kiss -REL leave:dual
The complex noun phrase is in the structural position
appropiate to the subject of the main verb. In order to
be well-formed this relative clause expression must be
capable of referring to two entities since the main verb
requires a dual subject. However, the expression as a
whole cannot, in fact, refer to two entities since there
is no noun phrase in the subordinate clause which can so
refer. There are, to be sure, two noun phrases which
jointly refer to two entities, but there is no one noun
phrase which can, and this latter is the requirement, namely,
that coreference be possible between the relative clause
expression as a whole and some noun phrase in the subordi-
nate clause--the sequence /ashkii at'64d/, although it
refers to two entities, is not a noun phrase. Just as in
the deletion theory, so in the headless base theory, the
grammaticality of (2.21) is attributable to conflicting
number selection. Thus, the subject of /dahdii'5Azh/ must
be dual, but the relative clause expression cannot, in
fact, be dual.
A proper formulation of the interpretation of relative
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clauses must be capable of accounting for the well-
formedness of (2.26a) and the ill-formedness of (2.26b),
in both of which no noun phrase is overtly present in the
subordinate clause:
(2.26) (a) YAPiti' v dahdii' Azh
(speak: REL leave:dual)
(b) *Yilwod Q dahdii'Aizh.
(arrive :sg:REL leave :dual)
Although no noun phrases appear overtly in the subordinate
clauses of these sentences, the subject of the subordinate
sentence in (2.26a) can be understood as dual since the
verb form /yAilti'/ 'he/she/they spoke' permits either
singular or dual subject. Therefore, the relative clause
/yAAlti' g/ may refer to two entities as is required by the
main verb /dahdii'AAzh/. Sentence (2.26b) on the other
hand is ill-formed precisely because the relative clause
expression /yilwod e/ cannot refer to two entities. This
follows from the fact that the verb form /yllwod/ 'arrived
running (sg)' requires a singular subject. I would like
to formulate the principle for interpreting relative
clauses in terms of the notion "argument" rather than in
terms of the notion NP. The principle might be expressed
as follows:
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(2.27) The Interpretation of Relative Clauses
A relative clause expression [ pS ]N
refers to an entity which is the referent
of one of the arguments within S.
It may, of course, be the case that the notion "argument"
coincides exactly with an element represented in phrase
markers as NP--but that depends, ultimately, upon the
theory adopted for "missing noun phrases" (see, for
example, Chapter Four below). In any event, the term
"argument" is to be understood as including such notions
as 'subject of verb', 'object of verb', 'object of post-
position', and so on. It is not necessary that an argument
be overtly represented by a noun phrase. Thus, for example,
in sentence (2.26), the subject argument of the subordinate
verb /yA*lti'/ is not overt. It is nonetheless correct to
say that the verb has a subject argument--an "understood
subject", if you will. Moreover, that subject argument is
capable of referring to two entities. The relative clause
expression, therefore, can have dual number reference as
required by the main verb /dahdii'AAzh/. Hence, (2.26a)
is well-formed. The relative clause expression in (2.26b),
by contrast, fails to conform to the constraint embodied in
(2.27), since the main verb requires that it have dual
reference while the subordinate verb requires that its sole
argument, i.e., its subject, have singular reference. The
expression as a whole cannot, therefore, be coreferential
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with an argument in the subordinate clause.
2.5 Ambiguity of Relative Clause Expressions and the First
Noun Phrase Principle in Pronominalization
Returning again to the contrast between relativization
and pronominalization, let us consider the ambiguity
observed in connection with sentence (2.25). The essential
fact is this: Headless relative clauses formed upon
transitive clauses of the uninverted (or S 0 yi-V) form
are ambiguous with respect to the identity of the relative
noun phrase--i.e., the noun phrase in the embedded clause
whose referent conincides with that of the relative clause
expression as a whole. That is to say, they admit two
interpretations--one according to which the subject is
understood as being modified by the relative clause
expression and another according to which it is the object
that is being modified. This ambiguity is present in (2.25)
where either /ashkii/ or /at'64d/ may be understood as the
subject of the main verb /deezgo'/.
Under the deletion theory of relative clause formation,
this ambiguity is accounted for by positing distinct under-
lying structures--differing in the choice of head noun
phrase. Thus, in the case of (2.25), the noun phrase
/ashkii/ appears in head position for the (a) reading,
while the noun phrase /at'64d/ appears in head position for
the (b) reading.
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(2.2E3) (a) S
NP V
S NP
S REL
NP NP V
ashkii at'eed yi'd66sol -Qe ashkii dee
boy girl whistle -REL boy fal.
zgo'
1
S
(b) NP V
S NP
S REL
NP NP VI I I
ashkii at'64d yi'd6esol - e at'66d deezgo'
boy girl whistle -REL girl fall
And, in general under the deletion theory, the ambiguity
of headless relative clauses formed on S O yi-V sentences
is due to the effect of forward application of rule (1.15)
which deletes the head and thereby obliterates from sur-
face structure the information which would permit the
assignment of a unique interpretation.
On the alternative theory, according to which relative
clauses are basically headless, the ambiguity of (2.25)
would be accounted for simply by virtue of the fact that
the form of a relative clause does not, in and of itself,
determine which of two (or more) noun phrases in the sub-
ordinate clause is the relative noun phrase. Relative
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clauses are simply subject to interpretation in accordance
with the principle expressed in (2.27), which, in the case
of (2.25), allows either of the two interpretations repre-
sented in (2.25', 2'25''), above.
Whichever theory of the headless relative clause is
ultimately determined to be correct, it will be necessary
in one way or another to account for the fact that the
ambiguity present in (2.25) is absent from the parallel
case of pronominalization presented in (2.29) below:
(2.29) Ashkii at'46d yi'd64solgo deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle:COMP fall)
When the boy whistled at the girl, he
(tripped and) fell.
The sentence is unambiguous with respect to the question of
which of the two noun phrases in the subordinate clause, if
either, is understood as the subject of the main verb.
Although there exists a reading according to which neither
of those noun phrase is the subject of /deezgo'/, if either
is so interpreted, it must be the first, not the second.
Evidently, it is a general principle in Navajo that,
in cases of so-called pronominalization, if two adjacent
noun phrases are potential antecedents for an understood,
or "missing" noun phrase to the right, only the first of
the two may be interpreted as the actual antecedent. This
principle can also be observed in a coordinate sentence like
the following in which only /ashkii/ is understood as the
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subject of the verb in the second conjunct.
(2.30) Ashkii at'64d yi'd66sol d66 deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle and fall)
The boy whistled at the girl and he (tripped
and) fell.
The effect of this principle extends through an indefinite
number of missing noun phrases, as can be seen by such
sentences as the following:
(2.31) Ashkii at'64d yi'd66sol d66 deezgo' d66
(boy girl whistle and fall and
haicha d66 nidii'na' d66 yaaltil d666
cry and get:up and run and
naadeezgo'.
fall: again)
The boy whistled at the girl and he fell and
he started to cry and he got up and
he started to rur and he fell again.
In this sentence, of the two overt noun phrases, only the
first (i.e., /ashkii/) may be understood as the antecedent
of the missing subjects in the non-initial conjuncts. How-
ever, the effect of the principle is cancelled if an overt
noun phrase candidate antecedent intervenes between the
NP NP sequence and a gap farther to the right. Thus, in
the following sentences, any of the overtly present noun
phrases may be understood as antecedent for the missing
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subject of the final conjunct:
(2.32) (a) Ashkii at'66d yi'de6sol d66 asdzi4n
(boy girl waistle and woman
yah'iiyA d66 deezgo'.
enter and fall)
The boy. whistled at the girl, the woman
entered, and he. (tripped and) fell.
1
The boy whistled at the girl., the woman
entered, and she. (tripped and) fell.
The boy whistled at the girl, the woman.1
entered, and she. (tripped and) fell.
The boy.i whistled at the girl., the womank
entered, and (he/she)1 (tripped
and) fell.
(b) Ashkii at'46d yL'd66sol d66 hastiin
(boy girl whistle and man
yiyiilts$ d66 deezgo'.
see and fall)
The boyi whistled at the girl, he. saw the1 1
man, and he. (tripped and) fell.
1
The boy i whistled at the girlj, he. saw the
man, and she. (tripped and) fell.
The boy i whistled at the girl, he. saw the1 1
man., and hej (tripped and) fell.
The boy i whistled at the girlj, he. saw the
mank , and (he/she) 1 (tripped and) fell.
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Notice, incidently, that while the subject of the final
conjunct may be understood as being coreferential with any
of the overt noun phrases present in the sentence, such is
not the case for the medial conjunct /...hastiin yiyiilts4/
'...saw the man'. The subject of that conjunct, if found
in the sentence at all, must be /ashkii/ not /at'66d/.
This follows from the principle, because it is enforced
from the medial conjunct leftwards.
It should be mentioned also that the principle is in
full force only where the gap corresponding to the missing
noun phrase is to the right of the NP NP sequence. Thus,
in the following case of "backward pronominalization", while
the favored reading is that in which /ashkii/ is understood
as the subject of the subordinate verb, the reading
according to which /at'66d/ is the subject of that verb is
also available.
(2.33) Yah'iiyaago ashkii at'64d yi'd64sol.
(enter:COMP boy girl whistle)
(a) When he entered, the boy whistled at the girl.
(b) When she entered, the boy whistled at the girl.
There is also, of course, a reading in which neither of the
overt noun phrases in the main clause is understood as
coreferential with the subject of the subordinate verb.
Since the principle just described plays a role in
later discussions, I attempt a tentative prose formulation
of it in (2.34) below:
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(2.34) First Noun Phrase Principle
Given a string of the form
NP1 NP2...GAP,
in which GAP corresponds to a
"missing noun phrase", NP1,
but nct NP2, may be understood as
the antecedent of the missing noun
phrase. This is so, however, only
if the ellipsis contains no noun
phrase which could serve as
antecedent.
In the examples of the operation of the First Noun
Phrase Principle so far adduced, the NP NP sequences have
consistently been subject and object, in that order, of the
verb of their clause. The principle operates also in the
case where the NP NP sequence are object-subject--i.e.,
where their clause is of the inverted type. Thus, in the
following sentence, /at'64d/, the logical object of the
subordinate clause, is understood to be the antecedent of
the missing subject in the main clause:
(2.35) At'64d ashkii bi'd64solgo deezgo'.
(girl boy bi:whistle:COMP fall)
When the girl was whistled at by the boy,
she (tripped and) fell.
It is natural to ask whether the two consecutive noun
phrases referred to in the First Noun Phrase Principle must
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be co-arguments within the same clause. In other words,
is the principle operative where a clause boundry inter-
venes between the two noun phrases? Consider, for example,
the following surface structure:
(2.36)
S
NP S V
NP V
D NI I
ashkii dii at'66d nilk'ol diiniid dc
boy this girl blink say ax
S
o6 neezd4
nd sit
This structure directly underlies the following sentence:
(2.37) Ashkii dii at'66d nilk'ol diiniid d66 neezdA.
(boy this girl blink say and sit)
(a) The boy said "this girl blinks" and he sat
down.
(b) ?The boy said "this girl blinks" and she sat
down.
The question, of course, is whether /dii at'66d/ 'this girl'
can be understood as the antecedent of the missing subject
in the second conjunct--i.e., whether, the (b) reading is
possible for (2.37). While it is not particularly easy to
come to a clear decision in this regard, I feel that it is
possible, with considerable difficulty, to attribute the
(b) reading to (2.37), although the (a) reading is much
preferred. I am not sure what property of (2.37) is
S
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responsible for the weakening of the First Noun Phrase
Principle, so I will not attempt to add any further
refinement to it. It should, in any event, be borne in
mind that the principle is not iron-clad. It is possible
to weaken the force of the principle in a variety of ways
by altering the situation being described in a particular
sentence. Consider, for example, the following:
(2.38) At'44d li$' yiztalgo deesgeed.
(girl horse spur:COMP buck)
When the girl spurred the horse, it started
bucking.
Here, the overwhelmingly favored interpretation is that in
which the noun phrase /1f'/--i.e., the second of the two
consecutive noun phrases--is understood as antecedent for
the missing subject of the main verb /deesgeed/ 'started
to buck'. Only in a very special circumstance could the
alternative interpretation be attributed to this sentence--
e.g., where the girl is pretending to be a mare, say, and
the entity referred to by /11i'/ is, say, a stuffed animal,
and, moreover, /yiztal/ is understood to mean 'kicked'
rather than 'spurred'.
The above qualifications do not alter the basic point
concerning the contrast between relative clauses and
pronominalization. A semantically uncomplicated sentence
like (2.29) conforms clearly to the First Noun Phrase
Principle, and is unambiguous with respect to the choice
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of antecedents in a NP NP sequence. The closely parallel
relative clause (2.25), however, is ambiguous with respect
to the identity of the relative noun phrase.
2.6 Coreference Between Overt Noun Phrases
In concluding this chapter, I wish to mention one
final contrast between "pronominalization" and relative
clause formation. Consider the following sentence:
(2.39) Hastiin deezghalgo hastiin nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP man get:up)
This is identical to (1.13) cited above, except that the
noun phrase /hastiin/ appears overtly both as subject of
the subordinate verb and the subject of the main verb.
This sentence is somewhat awkward but it is possible, and
moreover it is ambiguous according to whether or not the
two instances of /hastiin/ are understood as coreferential.
The co-reference reading is aided somewhat by employing the
suffix /-(y)Q / 'aforementioned definite (DEF)' appended to
the second instance.
(2.40) Hastiin deezghalgo hastiin e nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP man:DEF get:up)
When the man awoke, that same man got up.
Under the deletion theory of pronominalization, one could
account for the possibility of coreference in (2.39) and
(2.40) by stipulating that pronominalization is optional.
However, if relativization is also by deletion, then the
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deletion rule must be obligatory when it is used to form
relative clauses because the hypothetical deletionless
relative clause parallel to (2.39) and (2.40) is completely
ungrammatical.
(2.41) *Hastiin deezghal'@ hastiin(OQ) nidii'na'.
(man awake: REL man: (DEF) get:up)
The ungrammaticality of (2.41) would, of course, follow
automatically from the alternative conception of relative
clauses according to which they are basically headless.
The purpose of this chapter has been primarily that of
contrasting "pronominalization" and "relativization". In
the next chapter I will present a preliminary hypothesis
concerning the nature of so-called pronominalization and
will make a preliminary attempt to explain the contrasts
described in this chapter and the similarity described in
the first chapter, i.e., apparent conformity of both
phenomena to the Second Noun Phrase Constraint (1.56).
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CHAPTER THREE
AN ELEMENTARY THEORY OF
NAVAJO PRONOMINALIZATION
3.0 Introduction
I would like now to turn to the question of an
appropriate conception of so-called pronominalization
in Navajo.
I will assume that it is correct in the Navajo case
to devise a unified account of the "missing noun phrase"
phenomena illustrated by the two readings of a sentence
like:
(3.1) Ashkii deezgo'go h6Acha.
(boy fall:COMP cry)
(a) When the boy i (tripped and) fell, he. cried out.1 1
(b) When the boyi (tripped and) fell, (he/she)
cried out.
And, in general, I will assume that a single mechanism is
responsible for the gap representing a missing noun phrase,
in cases subsumed under so-called pronominalization, regard-
less of whether or not the missing noun phrase in a parti-
cular instance finds its antecedent within or outside of the
sentence in which the gap appears. This seems a reasonable
position to take, since in both cases the superficial effect
is the same--an argument, known to be "semantically present"
by virtue of the meanings of words overtly present in the
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sentence, is "physically" absent, i.e., not overtly present
as a phonologically constituted noun phrase. However, if
this position is adopted, then it is quite clear that the
deletion rule (1.15) cannot be responsible for the missing
noun phrases of Navajo "pronominalization." This follows,
since the deletion rule requires that any missing noun phrase
(i.e., gap created by deletion) have an overt antecedent
in the linguistic context.
It has been recognized for some time that third person
pronouns in English cannot all be due to a process of
pronominalization--i.e., a process which converts a full
noun phrase into a pronoun under identity with an ante-
cedent. Thus, for example, Postal (1966) pointed out that
for sentences like
(3.2) She dances well.
in which the pronoun she is without an antecedent in the
linguistic context, it is "...quite sufficient to indicate
precisely that such [pronominal] forms refer to object-types
whose particular referents are assumed by the speaker to be
known to the person spoken to" (Postal 1966, footnote 3).
The consequence of this observation, of course, is that at
least some English pronouns are present in the basic or
underlying representations of sentences.
It has also been pointed out--see, for example, Lasnik's
excellent discussion (1976)--that even in cases of sentence-
internal coreference, there is no advantage in positing a
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/
pronominalization rule for English. The fact that he and
the boy can co-refer in
(3.3) When the boy fell, he cried out.
is adequately provided for by the rules of pronominal usage
implied by Postal's observation. The expression the boy
designates an object-type appropiately referred to by the
pronoun he. Moreover, if the addressee knows the referent
of the boy, then the speaker of (3.3) can reasonably assume
that the referent of both the full noun phrase and the
pronoun, under the coreference reading, is known to the
addressee. Thus, even where the pronoun has an overt ante-
in the linguistic environment, there is no reason to assume
that the pronoun is produced by a rule of pronominalization.
Independently necessary base-generated pronouns will serve
to provide all antecedent-pronoun connections in the
language.
Viewed in this way, the problem of pronominalization
becomes not one of producing pronouns in appropiate places
but, rather, one of determining conditions under which noun
phrases (whether pronouns or full noun phrases) can, must,
or must not be coreferential. In English, for example, the
grammar must account for such coreference facts as those
illustrated in the following sentences:
(3.4) (a) *Oscar. finally realized that Oscar. is
1 1
unpopular.
(b) *Hei finally realized that Oscar. is unpopular.1 1
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(c) He. finally realized that he. is unpopular.1 1
(d) Oscar. finally realized that he is unpopular.
Stook the book with him
(e) Oscar. took the book with him..1 1
(f) *Oscar took the book with him..
Recent work on coreference in English has advanced consider-
ably our understanding of these issues (e.g., Dougherty
1969, Jackendoff 1972, Wasow 1972, Lasnik 1976, Reinhart
1976). By and large there is now agreement on the question
of the basic status of pronouns, both those which do and
those which do not enter into sentence-internal coreference
relationships.
3.1 A Navajo Analogue to a Base-Generated Pronoun
In view of the observations I have made regarding
"pronominalization" in Navajo, it seems reasonable to adopt
for that language a treatment of missing noun phrases which
is analogous in certain respects to analyses of English
according to which all pronouns appearing in the surface
representations of sentences. The Navajo analogue, in very
superficial terms, would be an analysis according to which
noun phrases "missing" in surface representations are also'
"missing" in the base. The exact nature of the analogue,
however, is open to question. In the present chapter, I
will consider one conception of missing noun phrases, and
I will very briefly consider another in the next chapter.
First, I will consider an analysis in which missing
noun phrases are in fact present as noun phrases in the
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structural representations of sentences--i.e., as NP nodes
which dominate the phonologically null element PRO in the
phrase marker corresponding to actual sentences. According
to this analysis the phrase marker corresponding to (3.1)
above is roughly as follows:
(3.5) S
ArxrM MlD T7
r u naacna
boy fall -COMP PRO cry
I will not commit myself here as to the exact nature of the
NP-over-PRO substructure. In particular, I will not con-
cern myself very much about the status of the symbol PRO;
it is not relevant, so far as I can see, to the broader
issues surrounding the missing noun phrase phenomenon in
Navajo. The essential property of the proposal is that the
"missing" noun phrase corresponds to an actual NP-node in
the phrase marker--it is "missing" only in the phonological
sense. It is perhaps reasonable to view this structure as
arising by virtue of the optionality of phrase structure
expansion rules (cf. the treatment of certain phonologically
null noun phrase structures in Chomsky and Lasnik (1977)).
That is to say, it is possible to think of the NP-over-PRO
substructure as an unexpanded NP phrase. On this view, the
entity PRO is, in fact, the identity element e. I will
4MAb V Ll i-
3 %Ab naacna
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continue, however, to refer to the element as PRO, for
mnemonic convenience.
I should mention, before proceeding, that I have
briefly considered, and rejected, the alternative according
to which Navajo missing noun phrases are underlyingly the
third person pronoun /bi/ 'he/she/they' deleted from
surface structure by means of a rule similar in its effect
to "pronoun drop" seen in such languages as Japanese and
Turkish (cf. Perlmutter, 1972). Although this is a
possibility, it is somewhat perverse from the semantic
point of view in Navajo, since in a sentence like
(3.6) Ashkii deezgo'go bi hAAcha.
(boy fall:COMP he/she/they cry)
which would, under the pronoun-drop hypothesis, be the
source of (3.1), only with considerable difficulty could
the pronoun /bi/ be taken as coreferential with /ashkii/.
By contrast, the phonologically null PRO very readily
accepts /ashkii/ as its antecedent.
Returning then to the theory in which (3.5) is the
basic representation of (3.1), we can characterize the
problem of "pronominalization" in Navajo. As in the case
of English pronouns, the problem in Navajo is to determine
the conditions under which the PRO element may, may not, or
must be understood as coreferential with an overt noun
phrase in the same sentence. In (3.1) (=(3.5)), PRO
may be understood as coreferential with the overt noun
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phrase /ashkii/. But it may also be understood as not
coreferential with that noun phrase. In the latter case,
it is understood in the same way as a free pronoun is in
English--i.e., it falls under the principle of usage
articulated by Postal in his discussion of (3.2). Thus, it
is perfectly appropriate to use (3.1) with PRO referring
outside the sentence, provided the speaker assumes that its
referent (or referents) is (are) known to the addressee. In
fact, this latter condition--the "principle of cooperation"
as Lasnik (1976, p.2) calls it--is required for certain
uses of (3.1) with sentence-internal coreference as well.
That sentence is appropriate only where the speaker assumes
that the addressee knows the referent of /ashkii/ 'the boy',
at least this is so on the definite reading of that noun
phrase (the reading which would be the sole one available
if the suffix /-(y) '/ 'the aforementioned' were appended to
the noun phrase).
In the following structures, PRO must have external
reference--in (3.7a) because there is no overt noun phrase
to serve as antecedent, and in (3.7b) because the sole
overt noun phrase is not in an appropriate position to serve
as antecedent:
(3.7) (a)
PRO deezgo'
he/she (trip and) fall
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(b) _
S S
NP V NP V
RO deezgo' d66 ashkii hiacha
he/she fall and boy cry
In (3.7b) coreference is impossible because PRO precedes
/ashkii/ but is not in a subordinate clause. Notice that
this.failure of coreference would, under the deletion
hypothesis, be accounted for by placing a condition on
backward deletion (i.e., condition (2) of rule (1.15)).
We may assume also, following accepted belief con-
cerning well-formed anaphoric connections, that the
following structures would likewise require sentence-
external reference of the PRO element.
(3.8) S
NP P V
NP N
PRO ashkii bizh6'6 yiyiilts4
he/she boy his:father see
He/she. saw the boy's. father.i 3
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(3.9) S
NP NP VI
S
NP NP VI I I
PRO ashkii at'66d yiyiilts$(n) -4@ yizts'Qs
he/she boy girl see -REL kiss
He/she. kissed the boy. who saw the girlk.
He/she. kissed the girl. that the boyk saw.
Assuming, as I will, that the PRO element behaves like
a pronoun with respect to coreference, it seems reasonable
to suggest that sentence-internal coreference in (3.8-9)
is impossible because of the fact that PRO both precedes
and commands the overt lexical noun phrase. Notice that
the phonologically constituted terminal strings appearing
in (3.8-9) are in fact ambiguous, permitting a reading
according to which the subject of the main verb has
sentence-external reference and in addition, a reading
according to which the subject of the main verb is under-
stood as being coreferential with the noun phrase /ashkii/.
Now, if we assume that the PRO in (3.8-9) must have
sentence-external reference, then these phrase markers are
not the correct ones for these alternative interpretations
of the terminal strings. The interpretations according to
which /ashkii/ is understood as the subject of the main
verb correspond to the following structures, in which
coreference between PRO and /ashkii/ is perfectly possible:
82
(3.10) s
NP NP V
jP N
I II
ashkii PRO bizh6'4 yiyiilts4
boy PRO his:father see
The boyi saw his. father.
(3.11) S
N NP V
NP NP V
ashkii PRO at ed yiyiiltsb(n) -P' yizts'gs
boy PRO girl see -REL kiss
The boyi kissed the girl he. saw.
Coreference is possible in (3.10-11), I assume, because the
lexical noun phrase precedes and commands the PRO element.
According to this conception of the phenomenon, the strings
(3.12-13) below are structurally ambiguous, depending upon
the location of the PRO element--for the (a) readings, PRO
precedes and commands /ashkii/ (as in (3.8-9)), and for the
(b) readings,/ashkii/ precedes and commands the PRO element
(as in (3.10-11)):
(3.12) Ashkii bizh6'6 yiyiilts4.
(boy his:father see)
(a) He/she i saw the boyj's father.
(b) The boyi saw his. father.1
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(3.13) Ashkii at'64d yiyiiltsin4g yizts'Qs.
(a) He/shei kissed the boyj who saw the girlk.
He/she. kissed the girl, who the boy saw.
(b) The boy. kissed the girl. he. saw.
3.2 Non-Coreference Rule of Lasnik
It is relevant to notice that the lack of coreference
between PRO and /ashkii/ in (3.8-9) is, in fact, a special
case of a much more general coreference fact in Navajo.
Recall that coreference is possible between the two
instances of /hastiin/ 'the man' in (2.39)--repeated here,
with its phrase marker, as (3.14):
(3.14) S
Adv p V
NP V
I Ihastiin deezghal -go hastiin nidii'na'
man awake -COMP man get:up
Moreover, if PRO is substituted for either instance of
/hastiin/, coreference is still possible. Notice that in
(3.14), the first noun phrase does not command the second,
although it precedes it. Now let us consider the structures
corresponding to (3.8-9) in which the noun phrase /ashkii/
appears in place of PRO.
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(3.8') S
P NP V
NP N
ashkii ashkii bi zh6' yiyiilts*
boy boy his:father see
(3.9')
P
ashkii ashkii at'eed yiyiiltsi(n) -•6 yizts' s
boy boy girl see -REL kiss
Just as in (3.8-9), so also in (3.8'-9'), coreference is
impossible between the first two noun phrases. This sug-
gests strongly that a general principle is involved. I
will assume that a version of Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule
is the appropiate principle:
(3.15) The Non-Coreference Rule
If NP1 precedes and commands NP2,
and NP2 is not a pronoun [or PRO,
in the Navajo case], NP1 and NP2 are
non-coreferential. [Lasnik 1976, p. 6]
This simultaneously accounts for the non-coreference
observed in (3.8-9) and that observed in (3.8'-9')--in
those structures, the second noun phrase is not a pronoun
and is commanded by the first; hence the Non-Coreference
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Rule correctly blocks coreference. The Non-Coreference
rule, on the other hand, will permit coreference in (3.10-11),
since the second noun phrase is PRO, and it permits co-
reference in (3.14) because neither noun phrase both precedes
and commands the other. The Non-Coreference Rule will also
permit coreference in the following cases:
(3.16) S
NNP P N
PRO PRO bizhe'e yiyiltsl
PRO PRO his:father see
He/she saw his/her father.
(3.17)
NP NP V
Nr NP VI I I
PRO PRO at'eed yiyiiltsc(n) -QQ yizts'Qs
PRO PRO girl see -REL kiss
He/she kissed the girl he/she saw.
As in (3.10-11), coreference is possible here by default,
so to speak. That is to say, the Non-Coreference Rule does
not block coreference, since the relevant noun phrase--i.e.,
the second--is a pronoun. As Lasnik did for English, I
must also fo.r Navajo assume that the notion command is to
be extended at least to the extent of subsuming the
Wasow-Lasnik notion "Kommand" (Lasnik, 1976, p. 15) in
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which not only S but also NP serve as defining nodes. Thus,
consider the following in which a coreference interpreta-
tion linking the two instances of /ashkii/ is available:
(3.18) S
NP NP V
NP NI I I
ashkii bizh4'6 ashkii yiyiiltsi
boy his:father boy see
Since coreference is possible here, we must assume that the
first instance of the noun phrase /ashkii/ does not commnand
the second. Therefore, NP, as well as S, must be relevant
to the definition of command in Navajo. It is in fact
possible that the proper definition of command for Navajo
must be more general than this, since certain postpositional
phrase (PP) nodes also permit coreference in the relevant
configurations. Thus, for example, in the now famous
structure of (3.19) coreference between the two instances
of /ashkii/ is possible:
(3.19) S
PP NP NP V
NP PI I
ashkii bi{ghahgi ashkii ti'iish yiyiiltsi
boy beside boy snake see
Presumably, coreference is possible here, as in (3.18),
because the first instance of /ashkii/ does not command
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the second. Notice, however, that coreference is
impossible if the postpositional phrase as a whole appears
to the right of the subject:
(3.20) Ashkii [ashkii biighahgi] tl'iish yiyiilts4.
(boy boy beside snake see
In the case of (3.20), the Non-Coreference Rule, properly
formulated, will block coreference here because the first
instance of /ashkii/ precedes and commands the second. In
view of (3.19), it is possible that the appropiate notion
of command for Navajo is the notion "constituent command"
defined by Reinhart, and quoted here as (3.21):
(3.21) Constituent Command
Node A c(onstituent)-commands node B if
neither A nor B dominates the other and
the first branching node which dominates
A dominates B. [Reinhart 1976, p. 32]
With this conception of command, the Non-Coreference Rule
(3.15) will account for facts of coreference I have
discussed here.
3.3 The Best Possible Theory of Navajo Pronominalization
I will assume that the "best possible" theory of
Navajo "pronominalization" would be quite closely analoguous
to Lasnik's theory of English in that it would not, in fact,
have a rule of pronominalization assigning coreference
between noun phrases. Rather, it would have the Non-
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Coreference Rule which blocks coreference in certain
cases--a rule which is needed independently to handle cases
which do not involve a pronoun (or PRO in the Navajo
analogue) at all. Cases of possible coreference would,
in this view, simply be cases which are not blocked by the
Non-Coreference Rule. Instances of NP-PRO pairs which pass
this filter, so to speak, would be coreferential or non-
coreferential freely. Coreference would be allowed
provided it did not conflict with other principles of
grammar, such as, for example, the number agreement which
permits coreference in (3.22a) but not in (3.22b);
(3.22) (a) •
S S
NP V NP VI I I I
hastiin nidii'na' d66 PRO dahdiiyA
man get:up and PRO leave:sg
(b) S
S S
NP V NP VI I I Ihastiin nidii'na' d66 PRO dahdii'AAzh
man get:up and PRO leave:dual
Coreference is not possible in the second of these
structures because the subject of the first conjunct,
being explicitly singular in form, cannot be construed
with the subject of the second conjunct, which, although
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it is a PRO and therefore not itself explicitly dual in
form, must be understood as dual because of the verb form.
The coreference possibilities in (3.22a-b) are precisely
the same as in the following sentences (3.22a'-b'), where
overt singular /hastiin/ and non-singular /hast6i/ appear
in place of PRO:
(3.22) (a') Hastiin nidii'na' d66 hastiin dahdiiyA.
(man get:up and nan leave)
The man got up and the man left.
(b') Hastiin nidii'na' d66 hastoi dahdii'5Azh.
(man get:up and nen leave:dual)
The man got up and the men left.
The essential point is this: The best possible theory
of Navajo "pronominal" coreference would require no
mechanism beyond the independently necessary Non-co-
reference Rule and very general principles of compatability,
such as number consistency. But this best possible theory
will be observationally correct only if there are no cases
in which coreference must be positively stipulated for
Navajo. There are, however, such cases. One of these is,
in fact, not a serious problem because it involves a
principle which is needed independently of NP-PRO
coreference cases. I will describe this non-problematic
type of positive coreference immediately below, and I will
discuss another, more problematic, type toward the end of
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this chapter in connection with a revised conception of the
Second Noun Phrase Constraint (1.56) of Chapter One.
3.4 The "Proximate" Conjunction /-ii'/
In structure (3.14) above, the subordinate clause is
marked by the suffixal element /-go/, which I have glossed
COMP. This element functions as a subordinating conjunction.
Exactly parallel to (3.14) is the following structure, in
which the conjunction /-ii'/ appears in place of /-go/:
(3.23) S
Adv NP V
S COMP
NP VI I
hastiin deezghal -ii' hastiin nidii'na'
man awake -COMP man get:up
And corresponding to this structure, there also exist the
sentences in which PRO appears in place of one, or the other,
or both of the lexical noun phrases:
(3.23') (a) Hastiin deezghalii' PRO nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP PRO get:up)
(b) PRO deezghalii' hastiin nidii'na'.
(PRO awake: COMP man ge t: up)
(c) PRO deezghalii' PRO nidii'na'.
(PRO awake:COMP PRO get:up)
The terminal string of (3.23) and the sentences of (3.23')
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are unambiguous--they require the interpretation according
to which the subject of the subordinate clause is corefer-
ential with that of the main clause. The following
sentence is not grammatical, since two principles of Navajo
grammar come into direct conflict:
(3.24) *Hastiin nidii'na'ii' PRO dahdii'AAzh.
(man get:up:COMP PRO leave:dual)
The point is this: The conjunction /-ii'/ requires corefer-
ence between the subjects of the subordinate and main clauses.
But the subject of the subordinate clause in (3.24) is
explicitly singular while the subject of the main clause
must be understood as dual, in conformity with the ex-
plicitly dual verb.
This is clearly a case in which coreference must be
positively stipulated. It is, however, not restricted to
NP-PRO pairs since the same necessary positive coreference
is to be observed in (3.23), with lexical noun phrases in
both subject positions, and in (3.23'c) where PRO appears
in both positions. Moreover, the behavior of (3.23) and
(3.23') is not really part of the general phenomenon of
pronominal coreference, but rather a matter specific to the
subordinating conjunction /-ii'/. The phenomenon which
these sentences illustrate is widespread among languages of
Southwest, although it has not, to my knowledge, been
reported for Southern Athabascan languages prior to this.
The grammatical principle involved here has in recent years
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come to be referred to by the algonguianist term "obvia-
tion". In Uto-Aztecan languages, for example, it refers to
the situation in which a clause is overtly marked to reflect
either "proximate" or else "obviative" coreference (Grimes
1967, Hale 1969, Jeanne 1978, and see also Helke 1971 for
a discussion of bound anaphora, which constitutes an English
manifestation of the "proximate" situation). Proximate
coreference in the Uto-Aztecan usage refers to the case in
which the subjects of two syntactically related clauses
are necessarily coreferential; obviative coreference refers
to the opposite circumstance, i.e., necessary disjoint
reference between the subjects of syntactically related
clauses. Navajo, evidently, exhibits one side of the
obviative principle--i.e., its subordinating conjunction
/-ii'/ signals proximate coreference.
3.5 A Review of Contrasts Between Relative Clause and
NP-PRO Coreference
Let us assume that the conception of missing noun
phrases just outlined for Navajo is the correct one--i.e.,
that the Navajo analogue of pronouns, to wit phonologically
empty noun phrases, are present in the basic representations
of sentences and that an appropriately modified version of
Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule is at work in determining
possible coreference relationships among noun phrases. And
let us assume further that the alternative conception of
Navajo relative clauses briefly outlined in Chapter Two is
93
also correct--specifically, relative clauses which are
"headless" at surface structure are likewise headless in
the base, and the interpretation of a relative clause involves
associating, as coreferential, the complex noun phrase
expression as a whole with an argument appearing in the
embedded clause (symbolized by co-indexing the super-
ordinate NP node and an NP functioning as an argument of a
subordinate verb). With this model, the contrast between
"relativization" and "pronominalization" observed in Chapter
Two finds rather natural explanation.
Consider again the contrast in coreference relationships
between (1.13) and (2.1la)--repeated here as (2.25a-b):
(2.25) (a) Hastiin deezghalgo PRO nidii'na'.
(man awake:COMP PRO get:up)
When the man. awoke, he. got up.1 1
When the man awoke, he/she. got up.
(b) Hastiin deezghalg@ nidii'na'.
(man awake: REL get: up)
The man who awoke got up.
The first of these contains an NP-PRO pair, according to the
view we are now considering, and since there is nothing in
the sentence which requires that the noun phrase and the PRO
be coreferential, and since the sentence does not represent
a structure in which coreference would be blocked by the
Non-Coreference Rule, the sentence is open to the two
interpretations indicated in translation. By contrast,
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sentence (3.25b), representing the relative clause, is not
ambiguous. This follows from two facts: (1) the complex
noun phrase as a whole is necessarily understood as the
subject of the main verb, since that verb is intransitive
and the complex noun phrase is in subject position with
respect to it; and (2), the relative clause is formed from
an intransitive sentence, whose single argument, /hastiin/,
is the sole candidate for identification as the relative
noun phrase.
The curious ambiguity situation--noted in Chapter Two
in connection with sentences (2.29) and (2.25), repeated
here as (3.26a-b)--also finds a natural explanation in this
framework:
(3.26) (a) Ashkii at'46d yi'de6solgo deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle:COMP fall)
When the boy whistled at the girl, he
(tripped and) fell.
(b) Ashkii at'66d yi'd4esol Q deezgo'.
(boy girl whistle:REL fall)
The boy who whistled at the girl (tripped
and) fell.
The girl who the boy whistled at (tripped
and) fell.
Although (3.26a) is ambiguous, allowing both sentence-
internal and sentence-external coreference for the PRO
element, the point which is relevant here is the fact that
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on the sentence-internal coreference reading, PRO is
necessarily coreferential with the first overt noun phrase--
i.e., with /ashkii/ 'the boy'. This is due, I have suggested,
to the operation of the First Noun Phrase Principle, which
governs the selection of an antecedent from a sequence of
two adjacent noun phrases appearing to the left of the gap
corresponding to the position of the PRO element. This
principle simply does not enter into the coreference
relationships involved in well-formed headless relative
clauses, since the latter do not involve coreference between
an NP and a PRO. The ambiguity of (3.26b) follows naturally
from my account of the headless relative clause, in as much
as the subordinate clause, being transitive and in the
uninverted (S 0 yi-V) form, presents two possible candidates
for identification as the relative noun phrase. As expected,
however, sentence (3.26b), unlike (3.26a), is unambiguous
with respect to the choice of sentence-internal versus
sentence-external location of the subject of the main verb.
The complex noun phrase in (3.26b) is necessarily the
syntactic subject of /deezgo'/ and it follows from the
principle of relative clause interpretation (2.27) that the
"semantic" subject of /deezgo'/ must be an argument internal
to the relative clause. The observed ambiguity in (3.26b)
has to do with the identification of the relative noun
phtase and it is, therefore, only indirectly related to the
identification of the subject of the main verb.
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Finally, let us turn to the contrast observed, in
connection with sentences (2.16) and (2.21)--repeated here
as (3.27a-b):
(3.27) (a) Ashkii at'6ed yizts'Qsgo dahdii'AAzh.
(boy girl kiss:COMP leave)
When the boy kissed the girl, they left.
(b) *Ashkii at'66d yizts'gsgg dahdii'iAzh
(boy girl kiss:REL leave)
These two sentences contrast straightforwardly in terms of
grammaticality. In Chapter Two, I attempted to present a
conception of headless relative clauses which would explain
the ungrammaticality of (3.27b)--essentially, it involves a
conflict between two principles of grammar: (1) The
requirement that the subject of the main verb /dahdii'AAzh/
'they (dual) left' be capable of having dual number
reference, and (2) the necessary singular number reference
of the complex noun phrase, which follows from the fact
that each of the two candidates for identification as the
relative noun phrase is explicitly singular in form.
(Actually, this latter follows only under the assumption,
which I adopt, that the two noun phrases cannot jointly
function as the relative noun phrase, since they do not
jointly constitute a single argument within the subordinate
clause). By contrast, the grammaticality of (3.27a), under
either the sentence-internal or the sentence-external
cereference reading, is perfectly consistent with the
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conception of NP-PRO coreference relationships I have
described in this chapter. Sentence-external coreference
is, of course, no problem--Lasnik's "cooperation" principle
would simply require that the speaker believe the unmentioned
referents to be known to the addressee, just as the speaker
would in cooperatively using the simple sentence:
(3.28) Dahdii' AAzh.
They (dual) left.
I assume the sentence-internal coreference in (3.27a)
follows similar principles. Since the structure of (3.27a)
does not preclude sentence-internal coreference, there is
nothing to prevent PRO from receiving an interpretation
according to which it refers to the two-membered set
comprising the two individuals mentioned in the subordinate
clause.
3.6 A Revised Conception of the Second Noun Phrase
Constraint
The contrast between relativization and NP-PRO
coreference seems to me to be substantial enough to
justify distinct analyses of the two phenomena along the
lines suggested above. On the other hand, the burden of
Chapter One was precisely to reveal a certain similarity
between the phenomena. This similarity resided in the
fact that both appear to be subject to an identical
constraint--to wit, the Second Noun Phrase Constraint,
which I repeat here as (3.29):
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(3.29) The Second Noun Phrase Constraint
The second noun phrase may not be deleted
from a structure of the form
X - NP - NP - Y
except where the first noun phrase
triggers the deletion.
In connection with relativization, in the context of
the theory assumed in Chapter One, this constraint is
relevant only to the Eormation of the headed relative
clause--and then it is only partially so since the
exception clause is completely irrelevant, inasmuch as the
trigger (in the deletion theory) is to the right, not the
left, of the deletee. Let us assume here without dis-
cussion--since it is immaterial in any event--that the
headed relative clause is in fact formed by moving an NP
into right-head position. As pointed out in Chapter Two,
the appropiate formulation of the Second Noun Phrase
Constraint for the headed relative clause would be roughly
as follows:
(3.30) The second noun phrase may not be moved
from a structure of the form
X - NP - NP - Y .
This will correctly prevent the undesired derivations in
the formulation of headed relative clauses (e.g., (1.18)
from (1.20)) and, assuming that movement is also involved
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in "right dislocation", it will prevent undesired right
dislocation as well--e.g., it will prevent moving the
second or third noun phrase in (2.9). I pointed out also
that, in the case of the formation of headed relative
clauses, the constraint must be capable of taking a global
view of the sentence, since in certain cases, the relevant
NP NP sequence is not properly within the domain of the
rule--the first noun phrase being in a higher clause. This
hints already that the constraint is not properly a con-
straint on a rule but rather a more general principle of
some sort.
Turning now to NP-PRO coreference, it becomes quite
evident that (3.29) will not serve as it stands, since
deletion is apparently not involved in the Navajo analogue
to pronominalization. Nonetheless, it is necessary in one
way or another to "constrain" the appearance of PRO in
structures in order to account for the observations which
motivated the Second Noun Phrase Constraint in the deletion
theory--assuming, of course, that the grammar of Navajo
should relate surface strings to phrase markers which express
configurationally the logical relations (subject, object)
which arguments bear to their verbs. Under this assumption,
for example, a "fragmentary" transitive sentence such as
that appearing in
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(3.31) ... (d66) at' 6d yizts'Qs.
( (and) girl kiss)
(a) ...(and) he/she k :sed the girl.
(b) /...(and) the girl kissed him/her.
should in our current view of "missing noun phrases" in
Navajo, be related to a phrase marker of the form
(3.32) S
NP NP NPI I I
PRO at'eed yizts'Qs
PRO girl kiss
and not to a phrase marker of the form
(3.33) S
NP NP V
I I I
at'6 d PRO yizts' Qs
girl PRO kiss
This follows, since, in the type of sentence we have been
considering, the NP V string in (3.31) receives unambiguously
the (a) reading and not the (b) reading. The requirement
that PRO precede rather than follow the overt noun phrase is
identical in its effect to the prohibition, in the deletion
theory, against deleting the second of two consecutive noun
phrases. In essence the intended effect is to insure that
the actual surface string not be related to a structure in
which a gap--in the sense of a noun phrase argumnent position
not occupied by a phonologically constitued noin phrase--
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directly follows an overt noun phrase.
It is, of course, a relatively straight-forward matter
to translate the Second Noun Phrase Constraint into a form
which will achieve the desired effect in terms of NP-PRO
coreference. Considering (3.29) without the exception
clause, the appropiate translation would be very approxi-
mately as follows:
(3.34) Identify as ill-formed any structure
in which PRO immediately follows an
overt noun phrase.
This will correctly rule out structures like (3.33) above
and, therefore, insure that only (3.32)--with PRO preceding
the overt noun phrase--will be available as a structural
description for the fragmentary transitive sentence in
(3.31).
This new version of the Second Noun Phrase Constraint
will also guarantee that the sentence
(3.35) Ashkii bizh6'6 yiyiiltsQ.
(boy his:father see)
(a) The boy saw his father.
(b) $The boy's father saw him.
not be related to the following structure:
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(3.36) S
NP NP V
NP NI I
ashkii bizh6'6 PRO yiyiits4
boy his:father PRO see
It thereby accounts for the observation that (3.35) cannot
have the (b) reading. The constraint will also handle much
more complicated cases like that represented by (1.50).
The constraint as reformulated in (3.34) does not,
however, incorporate the exception clause of the deletion
theory version of (3.29). As a result, it will incorrectly
define as ill-formed the following structures:
(3.37
'gs
boy PRO girl see -REL kiss
(b)
NP NP
NP NI I
ashkii PRO bizh6'6 yiyiilts4
boy PRO his: father see
Under our current conception of the problem, (3.37a) directly
underlies the perfectly grammatical sentence
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(3.38) Ashkii at'66d yiyiiltsange yizts'Qs.
(boy girl see:REL kiss)
The boy kissed the girl he saw.
and (3.37b) directly underlies (3.35) with the (a) reading.
The exception clause in (3.29) was included to permit a gap
to follow an overt noun phrase provided it was construed
therewith--as is possible in the structures of (3.37). We
can translate this exception clause into our current frame-
work quite simply as follows:
(3.39) ... except where PRO is coreferential
with that NP.
It is quite obvious, however, that when (3.39) is integrated
into (3.34), the combined effect is the same as the following
formulation:
(3.40) The NP-PRO Constraint
If PRO immediately follows an overt
noun phrase NP', it must be coreferential
with NP'.
This formulation will accomplish the tasks for which (3.29)
was designed in the context of the deletion theory.
3.7 An Aside on the Reflexive and the Disjoint Reference
Principle
It happens that the sentences we have so-far considered
in our study of NP-PRO coreference have all had the property
that the NP and the PRO in which we were interested were not
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arguments of the same verb--specifically, we have not looked
at the simplest case of an NP-PRO pair, such as that
appearing in (3.41) below, where the NP and the PRO are,
respectively, the subject and the object of the same
transitive verb:
(3.41) S
NP NP VI &
ashkii PRO yiyiilts4
boy PRO see
Notice that the constraint embodied in (3.40) would preclude
this structure, except where PRO is coreferential with
/ashkii/. But (3.40) would allow the structure under the
latter interpretation--this would, of course, be the
reflexive reading: "the boy saw himself." It happens,
however, that (3.41) cannot receive this reading. I suspect
that the fact that disjoint reference is necessary in (3.41)
is, again, a general fact of Navajo, and not just a fact
concerning NP-PRO pairs. Notice, for example, that while
(3.42) is perfectly grammatical, it cannot have a reading
according to which the set denoted by the non-singular
object noun phrase /ashkii/ 'the boy' includes as one of its
members the individual denoted by the subject noun phrase
/Kii/ 'Kee' (a boy's name):
(3.42) Kii ashiik6 yiyiilts$.
(Kee boys see)
Kee saw the boys.
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Similarly, although the object prefix /nihi-/ is ordinarily
ambiguous--allowing either first or second person non-
singular reference, as it does in
(3.43) Ashkii nihiilts4.
(boy nihi:see)
The boy saw us.
The boy saw you (non-sg).
--it is unambiguous in each of the following:
(3.44) (a) Niheesh'$
(< /nihi-ghi-sh-' /)
I see you (non-sg).
(b) NihiLni'$
( </nihi-ghi-ni-'I/)
You see us.
That is to say, the sentences of (3.44) do not allow an
interpretation in which the set denoted by the object pre-
fix /nihi-/ includes the individual denoted by the subject
prefix--thus, the otherwise ambiguous object prefix /nihi-/
has only second person reference in (3.44a), where the
subject prefix is the first singular /sh-/; and /nihi-/ has
only first person reference in (3.44b), where the subject
prefix is the second singular /ni-/. I assume that the
prohibition against over-lapping reference observed in the
interpretation of (3.42) and (3.44a-b) is also responsible
for the impossibility of coreference between subject and
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object in (3.45a-b) below. In this case, the prohibition
against over-lapping reference results in ill-formedness.
(3.45) (a) *Sheesh'$.
( /shi-ghi-sh-' $/)
I see me.
(b) *Niini' .
(</ni-gh{-ni-'j/)
You (sg) see you (sg).
In each of these forms, the subject and object prefixes are
identical in person and number--/shi-/ 'lst singular object'
and /sh-/ .'lst singular subject' in (3.45a); and /ni-/ '2nd
singular object' and /ni-/ '2nd singular subject' in (3.45b).
The principle involved here is the "Inclusion Con-
straint" of Postal (1974, mentioned originally, but not
under this name, in Postal 1966), which gave rise to what is
now known as the Disjoint Reference Rule (cf. the "rule of
interpretation" of Chomsky, 1973, p. 241). This principle
will, in English for example, preclude coreference between
the subject and object in
(3.46) John saw him.
and, at the same time, it will prevent an interpretation
according to which the set denoted by the object noun
phrases in (3.47a-b) includes the individuals denoted by
the subject noun phrases.
(3.47) (a) John saw them.
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(3.47) (a) John saw them.
(b) John saw the students.
In addition, for many speakers at least, this principle
renders unacceptable the following English sentences.
(3.48) (a) *I see us.
(b) *You see you (all).
and it renders unambiguously exclusive in interpretation
the ist person plural pronoun in the following.
(3.49) Do you see us?
I will assume that Navajo, like English, has a Disjoint
Reference Rule precluding over-lapping reference, whether
total or partial, in sentences like (3.41-2, 3.44-5). I
am not sure how the rule should be formulated and I will
not attempt to formulate it here--hopefully it will be
extremely general (as, for example, in Chomsky 1973, p. 24)
and subject only to general constraints on rules of grammar.
I will simply assume here that Disjoint Reference is a
genuine principle of Navajo grammar and that it will, at
the very least, block over-lapping reference between clause-
mate subject and object noun phrases and/or pronominal pre-
fixes.
To be sure, Navajo has a way of expressing the situation
in which the logical subject and object are coreferential--it
uses a special reflexive form for this purpose. The
reflexives corresponding to (3.41) and (3.45) above are as
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follows:
(3.50) (a) Ashkii idiilts4.
(boy self:he:see)
The boy saw himself.
(b) Adeesht'$.
(self:I: see)
I see myself.
(c) Adiinit'$.
(self:you:see)
You see yourself.
The Navajo reflexive is open to a variety of analys:,. I
will, more or less arbitrarily for present purposes, adopt
the position that the reflexive element /'A-di-/ (actually,
a sequence of prefixes) renders a transitive verb intran-
sitive--i.e., no longer capable of taking an object noun
phrase--and that the reflexivized verb simply receives the
interpretation according to which the entity denoted by the
subject acts upon itself. Navajo also possesses a
reciprocal form--requiring a non-singular subject--as in
(3.51) (a) Ashiik6 ahiilts'.
(boys RECIP:they:see)
The boys saw each other.
(b) Ahiit'$.
(RECIP :we: see)
We see each other.
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Again I will assume that the reciprocal is developed
directly in the lexicon as a special sort of "detransi-
tivized" verb form which receives the reciprocal inter-
pretation (Navajo postpositions, like verbs, have reflexive
and reciprocal forms whose use is governed by essentially
the same principles).
3.8 The Combined Effect of Disjoint Reference and the
NP-PRO Constraint.
The combined effect of the Disjoint Reference principle
and the NP-PRO Constraint embodied in (3.40) above can be
seen most clearly in the following sentence where they
result in unacceptability:
(3.52) *At'44k6 'taahniidee' d66 ashkii yisddyiinil.
(girls into:water:fall and boy save:non-sg)
In this sentence, the transitive verb of the second conjunct
has the property that it requires a non-singular object.
There is, however, only one overt noun phrase in the clause.
The question is, where is the PRO? If it followed the overt
noun phrase /ashkii/, it would have to be coreferential with
it, according to (3.40), but that would violate the Disjoint
Reference principle which precludes over-lapping reference
between clausemate subject and object noun phrases. There-
fore, PRO must precede the overt noun phrase, thereby
forcing the interpretation according to which /ashkii/ is
the object of the non-singular-object verb /yisdAyiinil/
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'saved (non-singular)'. However, /ashkii/ is explicitly
singular in form. Hence, the sentence is unacceptable--it
violates a general principle of number consistency in
Navajo grammar.
Notice incidently that the corresponding structure, in
which the second conjunct is in the inverted (or O S bi-V)
form is perfectly well-formed:
(3.53) At'eeke taahn{idee' d66 ashkii yisdablinil.
(girls into:water:fall and boy bi:save)
The girls fell into the water and they were
saved by the boy.
Under the hypothesis that we are now considering the
structure of (3.53) is quite obviously (3.54) below, a
structure which is perfectly well-formed in terms of its
relationship to the NP-PRO Constraint expressed in (3.40):
girls into:water:fall and PRO boy bi:save
Sentence (3.52) is ill-formed for the same reason that
(3.55) below is ill-formed:
(3.55) *Hast6i ashkii yisdayiinil.
(men boy save:dual)
I
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The singultr noun phrase /ashkii/, is necessarily the
object noun phrase, by virtue of its linear position in
relation to the verb in this uninverted (S 0 yi-V)
sentence. But the verb requires a non-singular object, as
it in fact has in (3.56) below:
(3.56) Hast6i ashiik6 yisdyl'inil.
(men boys save:non-sg)
The men saved the boys.
With a singular object, the verb form would be as in (3.57)
(3.57) Hast6i ashkii yisdAyiilt$.
(men boy save:sg)
The men saved the boy.
In the framework under consideration here, the
constraint embodied in (3.40) operates correctly to contri-
bute to the identification of (3.52) as ill-formed. By
requiring that PRO precede rather than follow /ashkii/ it
forces the interpretation according to which that noun
phrase is understood as the object; a Navajo principle of
number consistency is thus violated and the sentence is
identified as ill-formed, as it is in fact. This is the
desired result, and to that extent it confirms the existence
of some principle of Navajo grammar having the effect of
(3.40). The question of whether (3.40) is itself the
correct principle is -an issue with which we will have to
come to grips shortly.
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3.9 A Unified Conception of Noun Phrase Gaps
If I am correct in my view that "relativization" and
"pronominalization" are distinct processes --particularly if
they are distinct in the way I have suggested--then it is
rather clear that the constraints embodied in (3.30) and
(3.40) must be reconsidered jointly, since they have an
identical effect.
The effect they have in common is that of precluding
the occurence of a gap immediately after an overt noun
phrase--whether that gap is produced by movement (or even
deletion) or is merely the position occupied by a phono-
logically empty noun phrase constituent. Elevating the term
GAP to the status of a technical term, and using it in the
generalized sense of a phonologically vacuous noun phrase
argument position, we can formulate prosaically the follow-
ing constraint which can be understood as applying to strings
resulting from either circumstance of grammar--i.e.,
NP-removal or NP-over-PRO:
(3.58) NP-GAP Constraint
Identify as ill-formed any structure
of the form
X- NP- GAP - X ,
in which NP does not "bind" the GAP.
The final clause of this constraint is included to permit
the case where the GAP corresponds to a PRO which is
coreferential with the immediately preceding noun phrase.
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Clearly, the constraint we now have is not a constraint on
rules but rather a condition on surface structures. This is
an advance, since it now permits us to remove a condition or
constraint from whatever rules are involved in forming
headed relative clauses and in producing right dislocated
structures. And it is also an advance in that it brings us
a step closer to a true understanding of the nature of the
problems involved in dealing with "missing noun phrases in
Navajo.
However, from another perspective, the NP-GAP Constraint
represents a loss in our over-all conception of Navajo
grammar. In my discussion of the "best possible theory" of
Navajo "pronominalization", I expressed the hope that the
grammar would require only the appropiate version of Lasnik's
Non-Coreference Rule (3.15) and that in no case would
necessary coreference between NP and PRO have to be stipulated
in the grammar. The constraint embodied in (3.58) is just
such a stipulation, however, since, like the more specific
version (3.40), it has the effect of requiring coreference
in any sequence of the form NP PRO.
In the next chapter, I will present evidence which goes
against the NP-GAP Constraint and, more generally, I will
discuss certain considerations which bring into question a
certain basic assumption underlying the NP-over-PRO hypo-
thesis which I have developed in this chapter--specifically
the assumption that the grammar of Navajo must relate surface
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structures to deep structure phrase markers which express
configurationally the argument structure of verbal clauses.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SURFACE INTERPRETATION OF
GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS
4.0 Introduction
At the end of the previous chapter, I arrived at a
prose formulation (3.58) of a constraint on the appearance
of gaps in surface structure. Implicit within this formu-
lation is a special condition on the appearance of the PRO
element to the effect that if PRO immediately follows an
overt NP, it must be coreferential with the overt NP. That
condition was expressed as (3.40) in Chapter Three, and it
is repeated here as (4.1).
(4.1) The NP-PRO Constraint
If PRO immediately follows an
overt noun phrase NP', it must
be coreferential with NP'.
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, this represents a
loss in our overall conception of "pronominalization" in
Navajo, since it constitutes a case in which positive
coreference must be stipulated between a PRO and an overt
NP antecedent. If it were not for (4.1) it would be possible
to "get by" with the Non-Coreference Rule of Lasnik, together
with other independently justified principles of grammar
not specific to PRO--e.g., the obviation principle illustrated
by (3.23) and (3.23') and the principle of Disjoint Reference
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illustrated by (3.42-45).
In this chapter, I will present and discuss certain
direct counterexamples to (4.1), and I will suggest an
alternative conception of the problem according to which
(4.1) plays no role in the grammar of Navajo.
Before I embark on the study of counterexamples to
(4.1), I would like briefly to repeat and hopefully clarify
certain fundamental assumptions which have underlain my
discussion up to this point.
I have been assuming that certain verbs, postpositions,
and nominal forms are subcategorized to appear with one or
more obligatory noun phrase arguments and, moreover, that
it is a condition on their appearance in phrase structures
that their full complement of noun phrase arguments be
actually present in the phrase marker in which they are
inserted. Thus, I have been assuming a condition on lexical
insertion roughly like that suggested by Chomsky (1965, p.
110 and elsewhere). I have also assumed that each noun
-J
phrase argument has a fixed position within the phrase
headed by the nuclear element (i.e., verb, postposition, or
noun) which selects it. This is relevant to the present
discussion in the following way. If an obligatory noun
phrase argument is not phonologicilly realized in its
appropiate position in the surface representation of a
particular phrase, we must assume (i) it was removed (say,
by right dislocation or by the process creating headed
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relative clauses), or else (ii) it is an instance of
NP-over-PRO. For the present purposes, I am interested in
the second of these cases.
Consider, for example, an intransitive third person
verb form like /yalti'/ 'he/she is talking'. I assume that
this form is subcategorized to take an obligatory noun
phrase argument, functioning as its subject. Navajo is verb-
final, and we have no particular evidence to assume that
there is a verb phrase. Therefore, the minimum phrase
marker in which this intransitive verb form may appear is
as follows:
(4.2) S
And it in fact appears with overt NPs in such sentences
as (4.3)
(4.3) (a) S
INY
ashkii yalti'
boy talk
The boy is talking.
(b) S
NP V
NP NPI I
ashkii do6 at'26d yAlti'
boy and girl talk
The boy and the girl are talking.
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(c) S
NP V
bi yAlti'
he/she talk
He/she is talking.
But, as should now be clear, in Navajo, such a verb form as
this can appear in an equally well-formed sentence without
an overt NP. Thus, the following is a perfectly good
sentence in Navajo:
(4.4) YAlti'.
He/she/they is (are) talking.
My assumption is, however, that the phrase marker associated
with this sentence has an NP (actually an NP-over-PRO) in
subject position as follows:
(4.4') S
NP VI I
PRO yAlti'
Similarly, a third person transitive form like /yizts'gs/ is
subdategorized to take two NP arguments, as it does overtly
in the sentence
(4.5)
NP NP V
I I I
ashkii at'64d yizts'qs
boy girl kiss
The boy kissed the girl.
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The verb is in the "yi-form", so the first and second NPs
are understood to function, respectively, as subject and
object.
This verb form may also appear with one or both of its
arguments missing--i.e., not phonologically overt as in
(4.6) (a) At'66d yizts'Qs.
(girl kiss)
He/she kissed the girl.
(b) Yizts'gs.
He/she kissed him/her.
Again, my assumption is that the missing NPs are instances
of NP-over-PRO:
(4.6') (a) S
jP NP VI I
PRO at'66d yizts'Qs
he/she girl kiss
(b) S
NP NP V
I I I
PRPR ORO yizts'Qs
he/she him/her kiss
And here again the arguments are arranged in the order
subject-object, as required by the yi-form of the verb. If
the verb were in a bi-form--i.e., /bizts'Qs/ 'he/she was
kissed by him/her'--the arguments would be understood to be
in the order object-subject (see Chapter One, (1.32-3),
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et passim), as in
(4.7) (a) S
NP NP VI I I
at'6ed ashkii bizts'gs
girl boy bi:kiss
The girl was kissed by the boy.
(b) S
NP NP V
I I I
PRO ashkii bizts'gs
PRO boy bi:kiss
He/she was kissed by the boy.
(c) S
NP NP VI I I
PRO PRO bizts'Qs
he/she him/her bi:kiss
He/she was kissed by him/her.
This line of reasoning extends to other nuclear
categories as well. Thus, the nominal form /bi-zh6'6/
'his/her-father'--is said to require an NP argument functioning
as possessor. And it appears with an overt possessor in
(4.8) below:
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(4.8) S
NP V
NP N
I I
ashkii bi-zhe'e yAlti'
boy his-father talk
The boy's father is talking.
Expectably, however, the possessor argument may be non-
overt phonologically, as in the perfectly well-formed
sentence
(4.9) Bizh6'6 yaiti'.
(his/her: father talk)
His/her father is talking.
In line with my general approach here, I assume the
possessor argument in (4.9) to be another instance of NP-
over-PRO. Thus, the phrase marker for (4.9) is as follows:
(4.9') S
NP V
NP N
I I
PRO bizhe'e yalti'
PRO father talk
Finally, a postpositional form like /binaag66/ 'around
him/her' is said to require an NP argument functioning as
its object, as in
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(4.10) S
PP V
NP PI I
ashkii bi-naag66 nahal tin
boy him/her-around rain
It is raining around the boy.
where this object argument is not phonologically overt, I
assume it to be present as NP-over-PRO in the phrase
markers. Thus, parallel to (4.10) above we have (4.10'):
(4.10') S
PP V
NP P
I I
PRO bi-naagoo nahaltin
PRO him/her-around rain
It is raining around him/her.
In general then, I am assuming that the phrase marker
for a particular clause or phrase matches the subcategori-
zational properties of the nucleus. This assumption is
crucial to what follows, since only under this assumption
is it possible to posit a PRO element in structural positions
which might violate the condition expressed in (4.1).
4.1 Ellipsis in Discourse
I will first mention a class of counterexamples to
(4.1) which is of relatively minor interest. I mention
this type here primarily to "get it out of the way", so to
speak, since the fact that it represents is very clearly
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one relating to the well-formedness of a particular type
of discourse.
In answering an information question, it is customary
to answer with the word or phrase which in fact constitutes
the answer. All or a part of the presupposed portion of
the question may be suppressed. Thus, for example, the
question
(4.11) HAl lA at'66d yizts'Qs?
(who Q girl kiss)
Who kissed the girl?
can be answered simply,
(4.12) Ashkii.
(boy)
The boy (did).
with ellipsis of all but the portion which answers the
question. Alternatively, it can be answered more fully as
follows:
(4.13) Ashkii at'46d yizts'Qs.
(boy girl kiss)
The boy kissed the girl.
But it is also possible to answer as follnws:
(4.14) Ashkii yizts'Qs.
(boy kiss)
The boy kissed her.
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This is a perfectly well-formed response, and, in the
question-answer discourse context, it is readily understood
as having the meaning according to which the noun phrase
/ashkii/ is the subject. But, with this meaning, and if the
missing noun phrase is actually present as PRO, given my
assumptions, the phrase markers for (4.14) must be (4.15)
below:
(4.15) S
NP N IV
I I I
ashkii PRO yizts'gs
boy PRO kiss
This is in direct violation of (4.1) since PRO follows an
overt NP with which it is not coreferential (and, incidently,
could not be, due to the Disjoint Reference principle).
There are several ways to view this problem. One way
is simply to allow the configuration (4.15)--with sentence
external reference for PRO--under the special circumstance
of a question-answer exchange. Another way--possibly the
correct way--is to assume that the missing NP in (4.14) is
not really a case of NP-over-PRO, but rather a genuine case
of ellipsis--simply a less thorough ellipsis than (4.12).
Under this interpretation, (4.14) would not be in violation
of (4.1) since there would be no PRO present in the structure
at all. In any event, I maintain that the use of (4.15)
in response to (4.111 is a matter belonging to the study of
discourse and is not properly within the range of topics
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with which I am attempting to deal. Henceforth, therefore,
I will leave this class of apparent counterexamples to
(4.1) out of consideration altogether.
4.2 PRO as Possessor
A more interesting class of counterexamples to (4.1)
involves possessive constructions of the type represented
by (1.57), repeated here as (4.16):
(4.16) Ashkii bizh6'* yiyiilts$.
(boy his:father see)
The point which such sentences were used to illustrate in
Chapter One was the fact that they cannot be associated
with a structure in which a gap appears immediately before
the verb. In our current framework, this means that (4.16)
cannot correspond to (4.17) below:
(4.17) S
NP V
NP NP
ashkii bizhe'6 PRO yiyiilts*
boy his:father PRO see
This is exactly correct since (4.16) cannot receive an
interpretation according to which the possessive construc-
tion /ashkii bizh4'6/ 'the boy's father' is the subject of
the verb /yiyiilts$/ 'he/she saw him/her'. Thus, (4.16)
cannot mean either (a) or (b) below:
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(4.18) (a) The boy's. father saw him..1 1
(b) The boy's. father saw him/her.
This, of course, is consistant with (4.1). On the other
hand if (4.17) were allowed, it would be in direct conflict
with (4.1).
It is possible, of course, to have an interpretation
of (4.16) according to which the possessive construction is
the object of the sentence, as depicted in (4.19) below:
(4.19) S
NP NP V
NP N
I I
PRO ashkii bizh4'4 yiyiilts4
PRO boy his:father see
This corresponds to the reading (4.20)
(4.20) He/she saw the boy's father
And again this is consistant with (4.1).
It is also possible for (4.16) to receive an interpre-
tation according to which /ashkii/ is the subject and in
which /bizh6'6/ constitutes the overt portion of the object.
Under the assumption mentioned in the introduction of this
chapter, the structure in this instance could be as illus-
trated in (4.21) below:
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(4.21) S
NP NP V
NP NI I
ashkii PRO bizh6'4 yiyiilts4
boy PRO his:father see
This is consistant with (4.1), so that this construction
may receive the interpretation (4.22) below:
(4.22) The boyi saw his. father.
In fact, this is precisely the interpretation required by
(4.1)--i.e., it is the interpretation in which PRO is
coreferential with the immediately preceding NP.
What we did not mention in Chapter One, however, is the
fact that (4.16) can also receive an interpretation in which
PRO refers outside the sentence, as in the reading (4.23)
below:
(4.23) The boy i saw his/her. father.
And, of course, it may be understood as coreferential with
a noun phrase appearing farther to the left but still with-
in the same (more complex) sentence, as in the (b) reading
of (4.24) below:
•T4.24) At'44d yah'iiybago ashkii bizh6'4 yiyiilts$.
(girl enter:COMP boy his:her:father see)
(a) When the girl entered, the boy i saw his. father.
(b) When the girl. entered, the boy saw her. father.
(b1he hegr .
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This is in direct violation of (4.1). But notice that it
is exactly what one would expect in the "best possible
theory" of Navajo pronominalization which contained only
Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule together with the various
general principles of grammar briefly described in the
preceding chapter.
This observation certainly casts doubt on the validity
of (4.1), increasing the chances that a more general--"best
possible"--theory of Navajo pronominalization is the correct
one. We must, of course, explain the fact that still
remains--namely, the fact that (4.16) cannot receive the
interpretation corresponding to (4.17). I will delay my
attempt to do this until after I have considered another
class of counterexamples to (4.1).
4.3 PRO Following Relative Clauses
A somewhat more intricate case involves sentences
containing relative clauses built upon transitive sentences,
such as the following:
(4.25) Hastiin lif' yizloh*e yi'diilid.
(man horse rope:REL brand)
(a) The man. branded the horse he. roped.1 1
(b) He/she branded the horse that the man roped.
The interpretations (a) and (b) are perfectly consistant
with (4.1). They correspond, respectively, .to the struc-
tures below:
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(4.
hastiin PRO 1lj' yi-zloh - e y-i'diilid
man PRO horse yi-rope-REL yi-brand
(b) S
NP NP
S
NP NP V
I I I
PRO hastiin I4' yi-zloh -Vg y-i'diilid
PRO man horse yi-rope -REL yi-brand
Interpretation (4.25a) corresponds to that in which PRO is
coreferential with the immediately preceding noun phrase
/hastiin/--as required by (4.1). And here (4.1) is
supported further by the fact that PRO in (4.26a) cannot
refer outside the sentence. Interpretation (4.25b), if
associated with structure (4.26b), is also consistant with
(4.1), since PRO is not preceded by a noun phrase at all,
and therefore does not even come under the purview of (4.1).
-The constraint embodied in (4.1) predicts that sentence
(4.25) cannot have an interpretation according to which the
expression /hastiin 4i' yizlohog/ 'the man who roped the
horse' (or 'the horse that the man roped') appears in
subject position, with PRO in object position:
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(4.27) S
NNP V
IP IP y
hastiin 14$' yizloh -~@ PRO yi'diilid
man horse rope-REL PRO brand
Thus, for example, (4.1) predicts that (4.25) cannot mean
(4.28) The man who roped the horse i branded itj.
This is observationally correct. However, (4.1) makes a
false prediction also. While it correctly predicts that PRO
in a configuration like (4.27) cannot refer outside the
sentence, it fails to allow an interpretation according to
which PRO in such a configuration is coreferential with one
of the two NPs within the relative clause. In fact, (4.1),
in conjunction with the Disjoint Reference principle, would
rule (4.27) out altogether--(4.1) requires coreference
between PRO and the immediately preceding NP, but since
that NP is the subject in (4.27), and therefore a clause-
mate with PRO, Disjoint Reference would preclude coreference,
thereby rendering (4.27) uninterpretable. The fact is,
however, there is an interpretation of (4.25) which, under
our assumptions, corresponds precisely to the structure
(4.27). This interpretation is the one inwhich the relative
clause is understood as "modifying" /hastiin/, and in which
PRO is coreferential with /1i'/:
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(4.29) The man who roped the horse i branded iti..
Under our assumptions, this interpretation constitutes a
counterexample to (4.1). That is to say, this interpretation
corresponds to the configuration (4.27), in which PRO appears
in object position following an overt noun phrase. Again,
doubt is cast on the validity of the NP-PRO Constraint
expressed in (4.1). This is an especially interesting
example for another reason--namely, PRO is evidently allowed
to appear in object position in (4.27), but it cannot refer
outside the sentence. This fact must eventually be explained.
Before proceeding to explain the observations we have
made here and in the previous subsection, I should point
out a certain fact concerning sentence (4.25) and its various
readings. The critical reading--i.e., (4.29), which
constitutes a counterexample to (4.1)--is somewhat difficult
to get, and I have had some difficulty in convincing other
Navajo speakers that it exists. The judgements are somewhat
delicate, since the difference between the favored reading
(4.25a) and our critical reading (4.29) is not one of "truth
value", but rather one of "modification" or "restriction"
by the relative clause. In (4.25a), the relative clause
modifies /i4'/ 'the horse', while in (4.27) it modifies
/hastiin/ 'the man'. It is perfectly understandable that
these two readings should in fact exist, since, as we have
seen, headless relative clauses formed on transitive
sentences in the yi-form are ambiguous with respect to the
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identity of the relative noun phrase. However, in the case
of (4.25), there is a very natural parsing of this string
which separates /hastiin/ from the substring /1i' yizloh-'Q/,
thereby favoring the reading according to which the
relativized verb /yizloh-4g/ is associated with /10i'/ 'the
horse'. I am referring, of course, to the parsing which
corresponds to the structure (4.26a).
To show that an interpretation corresponding to (4.27)
is in fact possible, it is sufficient to choose NPs in the
subordinate clause in such a way as to disfavor the
interpretation according to which the object NP is the
relative noun phrase. For example, if the object of the
embedded verb uniquely refers--or is "referentially
restrictive" in some sense--the subject is more readily
understood as being modified by the relative clause. Thus,
for example, the following sentence readily receives an
interpretation according to which it is the subject of the
embedded verb that is modified by the relative clause:
(4.30) Asdzain Kii ya'niltsoodep yich'ahb6shkeed.
(woman Kee feed:REL scold)
The woman who fed Kee scolded him.
In fact, it is almost impossible here to get the interpretation
according to which the proper noun /Kii/ 'Kee' functions as
the relative noun phrase. Therefore, sentence (4.30) clearly
establishes the possibility of a configuration parallel to
(4.27)--i.e., the following:
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(4.31) s
NP NP V
S
NP NP VI I I
asdzain Kii ya'niltsood-ý PRO yich'ah66shkeed
woman Kee feed-REL PRO scold
I take this to mean that (4.1) is in serious trouble. But
this is somewhat encouraging, because if (4.1) can be
eliminated, there is some hope that the maximally general
conception of Navajo pronominalization is correct. To
substantiate this, however, it is necessary to explain all
of the instances in which (4.1) appears to apply.
Another way in which an interpretation corresponding
structurally to (4.31) can be brought out is to form the
relative clause upon the inverted (or 0 S bi-V form) of a
sentence in which the subject and object are equal in rank
(e.g., both human, or both animal). In this case, the
relative clause will be unambiguous with respect to the
identity of the relative NP--it is regularly the initial NP
in such cases. Thus, the sentence (4.32a) readily receives
the interpretation corresponding to (4.32b):
(4.32) (a) LI4' dzaan64z bi-shxash-4e yi-ztal.
(horse mule bi-bite-REL yi-kick)
'The horse which was bitten by the mule
kicked it.'
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(b) S
P NPV
IS
N NPV
I I I41' dzaan46z bi-shxash PRO yi-ztal.
The string (4.32a) can, to be sure, be interpreted in other
ways, but the point I wish to make is that it readily
receives the interpretation embodied in (4.32b)--since
relative clauses formed upon inverted sentences (with equal-
ranking subject and object) are unambiguous. (It should be
pointed out, incidentally, that Hale, Jeanne, and Platero,
1976 p. 403, asserted erroneously, that such relative
clauses were ambiguous. This error was an unfortunate
accident arising from the complex logistics involved in
composing that paper by correspondence.)
4.4 Discussion: The Interpretation of Sentences
I will now attempt to show that a constraint like (4.1)
is unnecessary in the grammar of Navajo.
Heretofore, I have left completely out of consideration
the possible role which might be played by quite general
principles employed by speakers of Navajo in understanding
Navajo sentences. I hope to show that such principles are
intimately involved in explaining many of the coreference
phenomena described in the first three chapters. In
particular, I wit be concerned with principles which
speakers might reasonably be assumed to employ in assigning
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."grammatical relations" (subject, object) to overt noun
phrases in transitive clauses.
Let us consider the simplest possible case, namely a
transitive clause in which both subject and object are
represented overtly by noun phrases:
(4.33) (a) Ashkii at'66d yi-zts'Qs.
(boy girl yi-kiss)
(b) Ashkii at'66d bi-zts'Qs.
(boy girl bi-kiss)
As should be quite clear by now, the grammatical relations
borne by the noun phrases in these sentences correlate with
the morphology of the verb word in accordance with the
principle expressed in (1.35), which is repeated here as
(4.34):
(4.34) Interpretation of Grammatical Relations
NP is
(a) Object / 3 yi-V
Subject / bi-V
(b) Subject / NP yi-V
Object / NP bi-V
In these formulae, the expressions "yi-V" and "bi-V" are to
be understood as abreviations for "a verb word in which the
object prefix is /yi-/ or /bi-/". In effect, what (4.34)
says is that the NP nearest the verb is object if the
object person marker is /yi-/, but it is subject if the
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object person marker is /bi-/; and it says that the left-
most of two NPs is subject if the object person marker is
/yi-/, and it is object if the object person marker is
/bi-/. Notice that these principles of interpretation, by
themselves, will account for the readings assigned to
transitive clauses in which one of the noun phrases is
missing--i.e., clauses like
(4.35) (a) At'46d yi-zts'Qs.
(girl yi-kiss)
(b) At'eed bi-zts'Qs.
(girl bi-kiss)
By virtue of (4.34), the sole overt NP argument in (4.35a)
must be understood as the object; and, similarly, the sole
overt NP argument in (4.35b) must be understood as the
subject. Thus, these principles of interpretation are all
that is needed to account for the fact that sentences like
those in (4.35) cannot be associated with a structure in
which a gap--whether the gap is PRO or a "removal site"--
immediately precedes the verb. These principles, therefore,
preclude association of (4.35) with a structure of the
following form:
(4.36) S
NP NP V
at'66d PRO (yi, bil-zts'Qs
girl PRO -kiss
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Now it is my contention that this makes (4.1) completely
unnecessary in Navajo grammar. Moreover, I contend that
interpretive principles of the type expressed in (4.34) are
independently needed in any fully adequate description of
Navajo linguistic competence. If they in fact render (4.1)
unnecessary, then we can assume that the maximally general,
"best possible", theory of Navajo pronominalization is
correct. My job is not finished, however, since it remains
for me to show that principles like (4.34) do in fact account
for the various observations made in previous chapters.
Before continuing, however, I would like to pause
briefly in order to devise a somewhat more streamlined
formulation of (4.34), by collapsing the strictly structural
description included in it.
(4.37) Interpretation of Grammatical Relations
In an overt string of the form
(NPb) NPa V
(i) NPa is [aobj] if the object marker
in the verb word is [cyi], and
(ii) NPb is [(cc obj] if the object marker
is [-o yi]. (Where: [+obj] = the
grammatical relation "object", and [-obj] =
the grammatical relation "subject"; and
[+yi] = /yi-/, and [-yi] = /bi-/.)
These principles, of course, come into play only in the
interpretation of transitive clauses in which both the
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subject and object are third person. And I will restrict
my attention here to those cases, since they are the ones
which are responsible for the observations with which I have
been concerned in this study. Notice that the revised
formulation of the Interpretation of Grammatical Relations
(hereafter IGR) employs parentheses in order to accommodate
transitive clauses in which one of the arguments is not
overtly expressed by an NP. We can think of the structural
description in (4.37) as applying in much the same way as
does a phonological expression collapsing disjunctively
ordered rules (e.g., Chomsky and Halle, 1968 p.30), Thus,
the maximum expansion of (4.37) applies only where both the
subject and the object are overt. The shorter expansion
applies where only one of the arguments is overt. We are,
of course, immediately interested in cases where the shorter
expansion applies--as for example, in the sentences of (4.35)
above. The structural description in (4.37) will correctly
identify the sole overt argument in (4.35a-b) as NPa and
will interpret its grammatical relation in accordance with
principle (i). Notice, that the IGR applies to overt
strings; it does not itself take into consideration any PRO
elements which might be present in the actual structure of
which the overt string is a part. However, given the
interpretations assigned by (4.37) together with the
assumptions outlined in the introduction to this chapter,
it is possible to deduce the position of the PRO element in
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"missing NP" cases. Thus, for example, (4.37) assigns the
object relation to the overt noun phrase /at'66d/ in (4.35a).
The object is nearest the verb where the verb is in the
yi-form, as it is in (4.35a), therefore, the PRO must pre-
cede the overt NP, as illustrated in (4.38) below:
(4.38) S
NP NP VI .I IPRO at'e0d yizts' Qs
PRO girl kiss
An exactly parallel line of reasong leads us to assign
structure (4.39) to (4.35b):
(4.39) S
NP NP VI I I
PRO at'4 d bizts' s
PRO girl bi:kiss
Given the IGR, there is no way in which structure (4.36)--
with PRO following /at'66d/--could be associated with either
of the sentences in (4.35a-b). This is precisely the result
we want. And notice also that this account gives no role
whatsoever to our supposed NP-PRO Constraint (4.1). This is
also a desired result.
4.5 Possessive Construction Reconsidered
Let us turn now to a consideration of sentences of the
type represented by (4.16) above. The overt string in such
a sentence as (4.16) can be "parsed" in two ways--as
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indicated below:
(4.40) (a) (NpAshkii)Np ( pbi-zh6 'e)Np yiyiilts$.
(b) (NPAshkii bi-zh6 ' 6 )NP yiyiilts4.
That is to say, it is possible to view the sentence as having
two overt arguments for the transitive verb /yiyi.ilts'/
'he/she saw him/her'--as in (a)--or it is possible to view
it as having only one overt argument for the transitive
verb--as in (b). Now in the first case the IGR principle
of (4.37) will assign the object relation to the noun phrase
represented by the possessive construction /bizh'e6/ 'his/
her father', and it will assign the subject relation to the
initial overt noun phrase /ashkii/ 'the boy'. This corre-
sponds to the reading
(4.41) The boy saw his/her father.
Given our assumptions about the underlying representations
of phrases in Navajo, we must assume that there is a PRO
in possessor position within the second noun phrase of this
,sentence, under the (a) parsing. This is depicted in
(4.21) above. In accordance with the maximally general
conception of Navajo pronominalization, this PRO element may
be understood as referring to any entity properly subsumed
under the category "third person", including the overt noun
phrase which immediately precedes and c-ccmmands it in the
sentence--i.e., /ashkii/ 'the boy'. If (4.1) does not exist
as a principle of Navajo grammar--as I claim it does not--
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there is no necessity that PRO in (4.21) be coreferential
with /ashkii/. This is, in fact, the case, since the
possessor in the noun phrase represented overtly by
/bi-zh6'6/ may be an individual not represented by any
overt noun phrase in the sentence. That is to say, it is
possible to by-pass the noun phrase /ashkii/ in searching
for the referent of the possessor. The possessor may be
located in the linguistic environment, further to the
left, as in (4.24) above; or the possessor may be simply
understood from the extra-linguistic context. This is
totally consistant with the view of pronominalization
represented by Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule and with the
Navajo analogue to this view which I sketched out in
Chapter Three. The facts here seem to indicate quite
° cIparly that (4.1) is not a genuine principle of Navajo
.grammar.
Turning now to the (b) parsing indicated in (4.40)
above, the IGR principle will interpret the noun phrase
/ashkii bizh6'4/ 'the boy's father' as bearing the object
relation to the verb /yiyiilts4/. This corresponds to the
reading
(4.42) He/she sees the boy's father.
And we can deduce from this that the PRO element is initial
in the sentence--as depicted in (4.19) above. Since the
IGR itself precludes associating the sentence with (4.17)--
i.e., where PRO follows the overt NP--there is no reason
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to invoke (4.1) to achieve this effect. Again the role of
(4.1) is eliminated as a principle of relevance to the
understanding of Navajo coreference phenomena.
4.6 The Relative Clause Case Reconsidered
I will consider now the various observations concerning
coreference in sentences of the general form represented by
(4.25) above.
First I will deal with the observation that (4.25)
cannot be associated with a structure of the form illustrated
in (4.26a) in which PRO refers outside the sentence--rather,
PRO in (4.26a) must refer to the immediately preceding noun
phrase. Notice that this observation is quite consistent
with (4.1). If we are to eliminate (4.1), we must explain
these coreference facts in some other way.
It is quite obvious, that the IGR will account for the
fact just noted. Recall that the IGR is oblivious to PROs.
The task of the IGR is simply to relate overt NPs to verbs.
Now, if we consider the overt string of (4.25), we see that
the embedded verb /yizloh/ 'he/she roped him/her/it' is
immediately preceded by two noun phrases--namely, /hastiin/
'the man' and /111'/ 'the horse'. The IGR analyzes these
as NPb and NPa respectively. Since the verb is in the yi-
form, the IGR assigns the object relation to NPa (i.e.,
/lij'/) and it assigns the subject relation to NPb (i.e.,
/hastiin/). Now notice that this is sufficient to account
for the coreference facts. Let us consider the analysis of
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(4.25) embodied in the phrase marker (4.26a)--repeated
here for convenience:
(4.26) (a)
hastiin PRO 1_$' yi-zloh- ` yi'diilid
man PRO horse yi-rope-REL yi-brand
Notice that the noun phrase /hastiin/ appears in the
position appropriate to the subject relation with respect
to the main verb--and it will be assigned that relation by
the IGR. We see, therefore, that the IGR interprets
/hastiin/ as subject of both verbs in the sentence. Now
the PRO which appears in the embedded sentence must also be
the subject of the embedded verb--this follows, by default,
so to speak, since /1i'/ 'the horse' has been assigned
the object relation. Notice incidently, that PRO is not
assigned a grammatical relation by IGR directly, since PRO
is invisible to the IGR. We deduce the grammatical relation
borne by PRO from that assigned to its overt neighbor noun
phrase--the PRO bears the grammatical relation "comple-
mentary" to that of its neighbor; we may assume that this
is by some sort of general convention. Now if PRO and
/hastiin/ are both assigned the subject relation with
respect to the embedded verb /yizloh/ 'he/she roped him/her/
it', then it follows that /hastiin/ and PRO must be
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coreferential. And this follows from principles quite
independent of (4.1). Moreover, there is no need to directly
specify coreference between PRO and /hastiin/ in (4.26a)--
the coreference follows automatically from independent
principles.
In addition to the interpretations just discussed,
(4.25) receives two other interpretations which are relevant
to our argumentation against the NP-PRO Constraint (4.1).
However, one of these additional interpretations is also a
problem for the IGR, as now stated. But let us consider
the easy case first.
Sentence (4.25) may be parsed in such a way as to group
all of the overt string preceding the main verb into a single
noun phrase constituent, as follows:
(4.43) Np(Hastiin 13' yizloh-jV)Np yi'diilid.
Applied to the embedded clause, the IGR assigns grammatical
relations in a perfectly straight-forward way--assigning
the object relation to /1$'/ and the subject relation to
/hastiin/. From the point of view of the main verb, under
the parsing of (4.43), the IGR as currently stated will
assign the object relation to the complex noun phrase
expression /hastiin li~' yizloh- e/. And in accordance
with our assumptions, this locates the PRO in initial
position, as depicted in the structural description (4.26b)
above. And the PRO is assigned the subject relation by the
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"complementarity" convention alluded to earlier. This is
all very fine, since sentence (4.25) does in fact receive
this interpre tation--namely
(4.44) He/she branded the horse that the
man roped (=(4.25b)).
However, as I pointed out in subsection 4.3 above,
sentence (4.25) is open to another interpretation as well,
an interpretation which we adduced as a counterexample to
(4.1). This is the interpretation according to which the
relative noun phrase is /hastiin/ rather than /1i$'/ and
in which /1j'/ is understood as the object of the main
verb /yi'diilid/ 'he/she branded it':
(4.45) The man who roped the horse.1
branded it. (=(4.29)).1
In accordance with our assumptions concerning phrase
structure in Navajo transitive sentences, this interpretation
corresponds to the structural configuration (4.27), in which
PRO follows an overt noun phrase:
(4.27)
lid
horse yi-rope-REL PR0 yi-brandman
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This counterexemplifies (4.1), to be sure, but it also
presents a problem for the IGR as stated in (4.37) above.
This follows since PRO is invisible to the IGR, and the
overt NP--namely the complex nominal expression under the
parsing of (4.43)--must necessarily be interpreted as object
by the IGR. Thus, it would appear, we now face a counter-
example not only to (4.1), which is desirable, but also to
(4.37), which is regrettable.
I contend that the apparent problem is not a problem
with the approach that I am suggesting, but merely with the
conception of the IGR implied by the formulation in (4.37).
I neglected there to point out that the interpretive
principles must be capable of ignoring certain material
which intervenes between the transitive verb and the noun
phrases whose grammatical relations are being assigned. It
is clear that some sort of "variable" must be included in
the structural description of the IGR. This is indicated
in (4.46) below:
(4.46) IGR (Structural Description Reformulated)
(NPb) NPa X V
That a variable must be included can be seen even in such
simplex examples as the following, in which the entire
parenthesized substring is overlooked in assigning
grammatical relations to the underlined noun phrases:
(4.47) Hastiin asdzan (at' ed ashkii yil yi-ch'~ ' ) niini"lQz (</ni-yi-nil, z/).
(man woman (girl boy him:with her-to) yi-lead)
The man led the woman up to the girl with the boy.
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Let us assume that when the IGR assigns grammatical
relations with respect to a main verb, it may apply either
the longer expansions, according to which the variable is
non-null, or else it can apply the shorter expansion,
according to which the variable is null. In the first case,
applied to (4.25), the noun phrases /hastiin/ and /14'/
are directly associated with the main verb /yi'diilid/,
as depicted in the following analysis:
(4.48) Hastiin 4 ' yizlohO yi' diilid.
NP NP X Vb a
Now notice that the overt string (4.25) can be parsed as in
(4.43)--or better said, the phrase structure of Navajo
provides an analysis of the sentence according to which the
substring /hastiin 4i$' yizloh#g/ is a noun phrase con-
stituent--i.e., it is a relative clause. If we recall that
relative clauses built upon yi-form transitive sentences
Sare ambiguous with respect to the identification of the
relative noun phrase, we can see immediately how (4.25)
can receive the interpretation (4.29 = 4.45). When the
IGR applies as depicted in (4.48), it does not actually
assign a grammatical relation to the complex nominal
expression--rather it assigns grammatical relations
directly to the embedded noun phrases. It is because of
Sthe ambiguity of the relative clause that (4.25) can
receive the interpretation C4.29 =4.45). To. clarify this,
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let us use Fauconnier's indexing convention, mentioned in
Chapter Two, to indicate the interpretation of relative
clauses. The relative clause in (4.25), under the parsing
indicated in (4.43), may receive either of the following
two interpretations:
(4.49) (a) NP.I1i
S
NP. NP Vi1 I I
hastiin ild' yizloh -6e
man horse rope -REL
The man who roped the horse
(b) NP.I1i
NP NP. V
I i I
hastiin 4i' yizloh -Q@
man horse rope -REL
The horse which the man roped
The first of these corresponds to the relative clause
reading in (4.29 =4.45) which, according to our assumptions,
is to be associated with the phrase marker (4.27). The
second corresponds to the relative clause reading in
(4.25b = 4.44) which, according to our assumptions, is to
be associated with the phrase marker (4.26b).
One final fact about the possible interpretations of
(4.25) should be mentioned here, since it lends further
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support to our current conception of the IGR. Despite the
selectional properties inherent in (4.25), that sentence
can have the meaning (4.50) below as well as all of the
meanings mentioned heretofore:
(4.50) He/she branded the man who rowed the horse.
This follows automatically from the ambiguity of yi-form
relative clauses. Recall that the IGR mayz use the "empty"
value of the X variable. This, combined with the parsing
indicated in (4.43), gives the following analysis:
(4.51) Hastiin i4i' yizloh-4 0 yi'diilid.
NPa X V
Now the relative clause is interpretable as either (4.49a)
or (4.49b)--the first of these is the meaming in (4.50),
and the second is the meaning in (4.25b).
4.7 Some Final Remarks Concerning the IGf and Certain
Other Issues
The precise formulation of the IGR is a matter which
is still under investigation. In particuLar, the domain
to which it applies in a given instance, and the precise
way in which the X variable works are matters which are
not as yet completely understood. These issues are
currently being studied by Ellavina Tsosie. Perkins, at the
University of Arizona, in the context of a general
investigation of the yi/bi- alternation in Navajo sentences
involving third person subjects together with third person
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objects (of verbs and postpositions). The formulation of
the structural description embodied in (4.46) must be
understood as approximate. It is sufficient for our
purposes, however. What I intend to claim, essentially,
is that a principle of this general sort is unquestionably
involved in the interpretation, by Navajo speakers, of both
simple and complex sentences. Moreover, I claim that the
coreference interpretations which have led to the formulation
of the Second Noun Phrase Constraint (1.56), within the
deletion theory of pronominalization, and the NP-PRO
Constraint (4.1), within our present treatment of Navajo
pronominalization, are natural consequences of the IGR
principles; the special provisions represented by (1.56) or
(4.1) are, therefore, unnecessary in the grammar of Navajo.
While I will not attempt in this work to develop a
final formulation of the IGR, since that is, in essence,
being done as a part of Perkin's dissertation on yi/bi-, I
should point out here one fact of relevance to the domain
to which the structural description of the IGR applies.
With respect to the main verb in a sentence like (4.52)
below, the structural description (4.46) must be understood
as being able to apply in such a way that the IGR fails to
assign a grammatical relation to any of the overt noun
phrases.
(4.52) (AdvAshkii at'44d yi-deelchid-go)Adv yi-zts'cs.
( boy girl yi-touch-COMP yi-kiss)
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Thus, the structural description of the IGR must permit an
analysis in which the adverbial clause as a whole is taken
as a unit--so that the IGR will in fact fail to apply with
respect to the main verb:
(4.53)
(AdvAshkii at'66d yideelchidgo)Adv PRO PRO yizts'gs.
X V
On this analysis, the IGR simply fails to find overt
arguments for the verb /yi-zts'Qs/ (yi-kiss)--so that verb
must be interpreted as it would be in the totally NP-less
sentence:
(4.54) Yizts' s.
He/she kissed him/her.
That is to say, (4.46) must be allowed to fail to apply to
sentence (4.52) in order to account for the fact that it
can have the meaning given in (4.55) below:
(4.55) When the boy i touched the girlj, he/she k
kissed him/herl.
This sentence has a variety of other interpretations as
well. Notice that since the PROs in (4.53) are free,
there is no reason why they cannot in fact be coreferential
with the overt noun phrases in the adverbial clause--and
they can. Thus (4.53) can also mean
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(4.56) (a) When the boy.i touched the girl, he.
kissed her.
(b) When the boyi touched the girl, he.
kissed him/herk.
It cannot, however, -r. ve the interpretation according to
which the granmiLical relations borne by /ashkii/ and
/at'eed/ are inverted in the main clause. That is, (4.53)
cannot mean
(4.57) When the boyi touched the girlj shej
kissed him..1
This reading is presumably precluded by the First Noun
Phrase principle of Chapter Two, or by an appropriate
modification thereof.
Notice, incidently, that the IGR cannot fail to apply
in the parallel relative clause case since, under any mode
of application, at least one overt noun phrase argument will
be located for the main verb. If we assume that the X
variable of (4.46) cannot correspond to an overt noun
phrase--a necessary assumption for the simplest possible
case in Navajo (i.e., any NP NP V sentence)--a sentence
like (4.25) above will always present an overt noun phrase
to the main verb. Thus, (4.25) will be analyzed either as
(4.48) or else as (4.51).
It should be obvious by now that if I am correct in
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assuming that the IGR exists as a genuine principle
employed by Navajo speakers in understanding Navajo
sentences, then not only is the NP-PRO Constraint (4.1)
unnecessary in Navajo grammar but the more embracing NP-GAP
Constraint on surface structures (3.58) is also unnecessary.
The NP-GAP Constraint is repeated here for convenience as
(4.58):
(4.58) NP-GAP Constraint
Identify as ill-formed any structure
of the form
X - NP - GAP - X
in which NP does not "bind" the GAP.
You will recall that this is intended to cover not only the
NP-PRO situation but also the situation in which an NP has
been moved rightward, either to create the relative clause
or to effect right dislocation. Thus, it is intended that
(4.58) prevent association of the string
(4.59) At'44d yizts'gs(-e@) ashkii
(girl kiss (-REL) boy)
(a) The boy who kissed the girl (with /-#9/)
(b) He. kissed the girl, i.e., the boy i. did (as
a root sentence)
with an underlying structure according to which the noun
phrase /ashkii/ 'the boy' is in immediate preverbal
position:
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(4.60) S
N NP V
I I I
at'66d ashkii yizt3-'Qs
But the NP-GAP Constraint is itself completely unnecessary
to achieve this effect, given the IGR. The structural
description of the IGR will insure that the noun phrase
/at'66d/ in (4.59) is analyzed as NPa and, in accordance
with the object marking of the verb, that it is assigned
the object relation. Thus, the only conceivable position
to which /ashkii/ can be related is the initial, or NPb,
position. To interpret the sentence, therefore, we must,
so to speak, "restore" the dislocated noun phrase to its
normal NPb position--by, say, locating its trace and
assigning to it the appropriate grammatical relation (see
Fiengo 1977, for a detailed discussion of trace theory).
Precisely the same conclusion is reached when one
considers more complicated cases of this apparent rightward
movement of noun phrases. Consider, therefore, the
sentence (1.46), repeated here as (4.61):
(4.61) Hastiin at'64d yiyiiltsinoe ashkii yi'disool.
(man girl see:REL boy whistle)
(a) The man who saw the girl is whistling at the boy.
(b) The girl who the man saw is whistling at the boy.
: (c) The man is whistling at the boy who saw the girl.
The fact that (4.61) cannot receive the (c)-reading follows
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automatically from the IGR. Notice that the substring
/hastiin at'66d yiyiilts$/ must be analyzed such that
/hastiin/ 'the man' and /at'66d/ 'the girl' are respectively
NPb and NPa with respect to the embedded verb /yiyiilts'/.
This totally prevents any understanding of the sentence
according to which /ashkii/ is the subject of the embedded
verb. There is clearly no need to appeal to the NP-GAP
Constraint to account for the range of interpretations
assignable to (4.61).
There is in fact more to be said about the irrelevance
of the NP-GAP Constraint in relation to these apparent
rightward movement cases. There must be some principle or
other involved in the interpretation of these structures
which, in effect, restores the normal position of the
dislocated noun phrase. Without attempting here to
formulate such a principle, I will simply designate it the
Restoration Strategy. Evidently, given enough supportive
information, it is possible for the Restoration Strategy to
relocate a noun phrase in NPa position, following an overt
NPb , in direct violation of the NP-GAP Constraint and,
incidently, in defiance of the normally extremely powerful
IGR principles. Thus, for example, the selectional
properties inherent in the following sentence permit the
hearer to deduce that the right-head of the relative clause
comes from NPa position, not NPb position:
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(4.
V'in
man bi-bite -REL dog bark
The dog which the man was bitten by is barking.
With some difficulty, to be sure, this sentence can be
understood as having the same cognitive meaning as (4.63)
below, in which the NP /1eech4@'i/ 'the dog' appears in its
normal (NPa) position:
(4.63) S
NP V
REL
NP NP VI I I
hastiin 1eechq'i' bi-shxash -@Q nahal'in
man dog bi-bite -REL bark
The dog which the man was bitten by is barking.
The reason why (4.62) can correspond in its interpretation
to (4.63) has to do partly with the greater likelihood that
a dog would bite a man than the reverse and partly with the
specific Navajo fact that if the exmibedded sentence were
"restored" to one in which /166ch'18i/ 'the dog' appeared
ý b -
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in NPb position, it would violate a principle according to
which the higher ranking of two unequal nominal concepts is
placed first in transitive sentences of this type (cf. Hale
1973, Creamer 1974, Witherspoon 1977). In accordance with
the hierarchy principle, the inverted sentence (4.64) below
is an unacceptable way to describe the situation in which a
man bites a dog:
(4.64) *Le6ch4Qi hastiin bi-shxash.
(dog man bi-bite)
The dog was bitten by the man.
This situation must be described using the uninverted yi-form,
as follows:
(4.65) Hastiin l66ch44'i yi-shxash.
(man dog yi-bite)
The man bit the dog.
These selectional considerations allow recovery of the
meaning of (4.63) from (4.62) in violation of the NP-GAP
Constraint and in defiance of the IGR.
It is interesting to note, incidently, that rightward
movement and pronominalization are utterly different in
this respect. The exactly parallel pronominalization
structure in (4.66) below does not permit an interpretation
according to which PRO is in NPa position, despite the.
selectional facts inherent in the subordinate clause.
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(4.66) ?Hastiin bi-shxash-go l16ch4@L' nahas'in.
(man bi-bite-COMP dog bark)
When it was bitten by the man, the dog barked.
I do not know why this particular distinction between
relativization and pronominalization exists. However, it
seems reasonable to assume, as I have, that a special
interpretative procedure--in addition to the IGR--is applied
in rightward movement cases and that this Restoration
Strategy can overturn the interpretation imposed by the IGR.
4.8 An Aside on Rightward Movement
I feel that it is not out of place here to offer a
suggestion concerning the so-called headed relative clause.
In Chapter Two, I proposed that the headless relative clause
is a basic form and that the headed relative clause might be
derived by rightward movement of a noun phrase into the head
position--directly following the nominalizing complementizer
(/-1gMl, - Q/). I also pointed out that another apparent
rightward movement process exists--i.e., that which produces
the right dislocation structures. I intended to hint that
these two processes may in fact be the same. I now think
that this is indeed correct. At least, it is almost certain
that no special provisions are necessary just for the headed
relative clause, since a right dislocation process applies
quite generally in Navajo. It even applies in the case of
embedded adverbial clauses, producing from a structure like
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(4.67)
Adv NP V
I
S
S COMP
NP V
I I
ashkii yah'iAyA-(algo at'66d ch'6lwod
boy enter-COMP girl run:out
When the boy entered, the girl ran out.
the sentence
(4.68) Yah'ifyAago ashkii at'6ed ch'4lwod.
(enter:COMP boy girl ran:out)
When hei entered, i.e., the boyi , the girl
ran out.
In linear form, at least, the adverbial expression in (4.68)
closely mimics the headed relative clause. I suggest that
exactly the same rule is involved in all such cases. The
use of this rule is somewhat marginal in Navajo and its
exact status is not altogether clear. It is not unreasonable
to assume that the rule is of the most general form--i.e.,
roughly as formulated in (4.69) below:
(4.69) NP Extraposition
X- NP - YV
1 2 3 ->
1 0 3 2
This is evidently a rule belonging properly to the stylistic
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realm in Navajo grammar. It is apparently capable of
extracting an NP any distance to the right and, moreover,
it can extract a noun phrase out of a subordinate clause
of the direct discourse type (cf. (2.10) above, and also
Platero, 1974, for other examples, and see also Kaufman
1974, for a detailed discussion of direct and indirect
discourse in Navajo). The term V in (4.69) must be under-
stood as subsuming not only a verb word of the type
appearing in main clauses but also the sort of verb word
which appears in desentential adverbial clauses and in
relative clauses--i.e., a verb form together with a suffixed
adverbial complementizer (/-go, -ii'/ glossed COMP) or
nominalizing complementizer (/-g19 , -@/ glossed REL).
Thus, the extraposed noun phrase appears to the right of
any such subordinating element. The precise point of
attachment of an extraposed NP in derived structure is not
clear to me at this moment, but it is probable that the
application of the rule is governed by quite general
constraints on possible "landing sites", constraints of the
type currently being studied by Mark Baltin (1978).
4.9 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have suggested that the IGR
principles--whose existence seems warranted on the basis
of even the simplest sort of transitive sentences in Navajo--
make unnecessary certain initially plausible conditions on
structures in which a noun phrase is "missing" from a "basic"
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argument position relative to a verb. I have not referred
to the IGR as a "rule" of Navajo grammar, but rather as a
"principle" involved in the on-line processing of sentences.
I will leave this question open, in fact. My guess is that
the IGR is best viewed as a perceptual strategy employed by
Navajo speakers in determining the grammatical relations
which overt noun phrases bear to verbs in a given sentence.
This conception of the IGR is consistent with the observation
that it can penetrate into a "subordinated" clause--i.e., a
clause overtly marked as subordinate by means of one or
another of the complementizers (/-go, -ii', -igif, -¼/)--
and this is normally impossible for established rules of
Navajo core grammar (e.g., Kaufman's Spatial Enclitic
Movement, 1974). A subordinated clause in this sense (i.e.,
marked as subordinate), may well constitute the Navajo
realization of the "Propositional Island" (Chomsky, 1977).
The direct discourse embedding (without complementizer,
cf. (2.10)), by contrast, is certainly not a Propositional
Island (cf. Kaufman, 1974; but see also evidence adduced by
Kaufman which raise serious questions about the proper
identification of islands in Navajo).
Given this general conception of Navajo grammar, we
must now face the question of the status of a structure
like (4.70) which, given our assumptions, is a proper
underlying structure produced by the rules of the base
component:
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(4.70) S
NP NP VI I I
ashkii PRO yi-zts' s
This structure has /ashkii/ in subject position, yet the
IGR must interpret that noun phrase as bearing the object
relation--this follows, since /ashkii/ is necessarily NPa
.
What, then, is the status in Navajo of (4.70)? Given what
precedes in my discussion, I must assume that (4.70) is a
grammatical structure in Navajo. The overt string which it
dominates, however, cannot be understood to have the meaning
logically associated with the structure, since the IGR
simply makes it impossible for that meaning to shine through.
I think that this position is correct, given my overall
framework. My position then forces me to the conclusion
that the sentence
(4.71) Ashkii yi-zts'Qs.
(boy yi-kissed)
is "structurally ambiguous". It receives only one interpre-
tation, however, due to the extraordinary strength of the
IGR principles.
There is an alternative to this position suggested by
Hale (class, Fall Semester 1977, cf. also Bale and Platero,
in preparation), which I will briefly discuss here, without
developing it fully. According to this alternative, the
rules of the Navajo base do not produce structures of the
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type (4.70) at all. Instead, the basic structure for (4.71)
is simply
(4.72) S
NP V
ashkii yi-zts'Qs
And, in general, there are no NP-over-PRO structures in
Navajo. Missing noun phrases are missing by virtue of the
phrase structure rules, which have optionality parentheses
around all occurences of NP on the right hand side of
expansion rules. This, of course, requires us to abandon
our basic assumption of this chapter--namely, that the
diathesis (or "argument structure") of a nuclear element
(verb, postposition, etc.) must be matched by the phrase
marker into which it is inserted. That is, we must give
up the condition on the insertion of lexical items. The
lexical entry of a verb (or other nuclear element) will, of
course, specify its diathesis--either as a part of the
semantic representation of the lexical entry or by means of
some notation similar in appearance to the strict subcate-.
gorization frames employed in the standard theory of
transformational grammar (Chomsky, 1965). Thus, the verb
form /yi-zts'Qs/ 'he/she kissed him/her' will be identified
as taking a subject and an object (further identifiable as
third person by virtue of the verbal morphology). The
interpretative component will, then, have two tasks. First,
it will assign grammatical relations to overt noun phrases
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in the sentence--using essentially the IGR principles. And
it will insert "dummy NPs"--dummy NP-over-PRO structures,
if you will--into missing noun phrase positions in the
phrase marker. Thus, in the case, of (4.72), the IGR will
identify the overt noun phrase as NPa and, by virtue of the
verbal morphology, it will assign to that noun phrase the
object relation. The "structure building" portion of the
interpretive procedure will insert a dummy NP in initial,
or NPb, position. One might think of the second interpretive
process as one which "builds up" a structure which can be
interpreted (or mapped onto logical form) in the most
straightforward way--i.e., in accordance with the self-same
principles which would operate in a "fully specified" phrase
marker, that is, a phrase marker with all of the arguments
overtly present as noun phrases. This is roughly the approach
suggested in Hale, Jeanne, and Platero (1977). The dummy
noun phrases inserted in this way are assigned their
grammatical relations in some way--it is reasonable to suggest
that this is by a reapplication of the IGR--and furthermore,
they are interpreted as definite and, of course, are candi-
dates for free coreference or anaphora in conformity with
the general framework developed in Chapter Three. Thus, the
"structure building" procedure just outlined would apply to
(4.72) to derive the "logical" structure in (4.73) below:
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(4.73)
"NP" NP V
PRO ashkii yi-zts'Qs
The inserted "NP" would be assigned the subject relation
and it would be interpreted as definite--just as the English
pronouns which translate it are definite:
(4.74) He/she kissed the boy.
The inserted "NP" is, of course, open to an interpretation
according to which it is coreferential with an overt noun
phrase--say, in an earlier clause, as in
(4.75) At'46d yah'iiyaago ashkii yizts'Qs.
(girl enter:COMP boy kiss)
(a) When the girl. entered, she. kissed the boy.1 1
(b) When the girl. entered, he/she. kissed the boy.
Notice that this analysis avoids the necessity of
saying that (4.71) is structurally ambiguous while being
understood unambiguously.
There is another possible advantage to this approach.
Consider, the following sentence.
(4.76) Ad d44' ashkii at'66d yi-yiiltsA(n)--'Q
(yesterday boy girl yi-saw-REL
yi-doots' 9qs.
yi-will :kissl
The boy will kiss the girl he saw yesterday.
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Notice that the adverb /ad4d44d'/ 'yesterday' belongs to
the embedded clause since it must go with the perfective
verb /yiyiilts4/ 'he/she saw him/her'--it would be incom-
patible with the future tense of the main verb /yidoots'Qs/
'he/she will kiss him/her'. This means that the sentence
must be parsed as follows:
(4.77)
(NAdo4d*' ashkii at'66d yiyiiltsAn*e)Np yidoots'9s.
Notice further that the relative clause is understood as
modifying /at'66d/ 'the girl'. It could alternatively be
understood to modify /ashkii/ 'the boy', but the fact that
it can--and most readily does--modify /at'6ed/ indicates
that the complex relative expression is in object position.
If this is so, then under our NP-over-PRO theory of Chapter
Three, which we have maintained heretofore in this chapter
as well, we must have an NP-over-PRO in subject position
with respect to the main verb /yidoots'Qs/, as indicated in
the following phrase marker:
(4 78) S
EP NP VI
S
s REL
I .I I I I
PRO ad44d44' ashkii at'ebd yiyiiltsin- 9 yidoots'Qs
PRO yesterday boy girl yi:see *-REL yi:kiss
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But the subject of the main verb can be readily understood
as being coreferential with that of the embedded verb--as
in the translation given in (4.76). That is to say, the
PRO can be coreferential with an overt noun phrase which
it both precedes and commands. This is in direct violation
of Lasnik's Non-Coreference Rule (3.15), which otherwise
works perfectly and is moreover necessary in the grammar of
Navajo. Notice, incidently, that %-e cannot assume that the
underlying structure of (4.76) has /ashkii/ outside the
relative clause and that the adverb has simply "scrambled"
forward from the position it occupies in the well-formed
alternative
(4.79) Ashkii ad~~d4' at'44d yiyiiltsinoe yidoots'Qs.
This sort of scrambling is not allowed in Navajo. Thus,
from
(4.80) Ashkii ad6id44' at'46d deeztlizhog yidoots'Qs.
(boy yesterday girl trip:fall:REL kiss)
The boy will kis:! the girl who fell down yesterday.
one cannot get:
(4.81) *Ad4odf ' ashkii at'64d deezhtlizhO@ yidoots'Qs.
The alternative proposal--i.e., that which does not
posit underlying NP-over-PRO structures--does not have to
face the dilemma brought about by (4.76). According to this
alternative, the structure of (4.761 would b.e the same as
(4.78), but without the NP-over-PRO--i.e., it would be
169
(4.82) S
NP V
S
S REL
Adv NP NP VI I I I
ad66d44' ashkii at'6'd yiyiiltsg -6@ yidoots'Qs
yesterday boy girl see-REL kiss
This would receive the interpretation of interest here--i.e.,
(4.83) The boy will kiss the girl he saw yesterday.
--by direct application of the IGR. Nor would any dummy
NP-over-PRO have to be inserted at an intermediate
interpretive stage in this structure, since the IGR will
succeed in locating overt noun phrase arguments for both
the subordinate verb and the main verb. In the latter case,
the analysis would be as follows:
(4.84) Ad*4~d ' ashkii at'e4d yiyiiltsanee
NP NP Xb a
'Qs.
V
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